D-Day for the G.O.P.

The Reporter

July 22, 1952 25c

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Nigerian Drum Major (see page 22)

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

THE REPORTER'S NOTES

Pragmatism vs. Dogmatism

Joseph C. Harsch's article in this issue makes a good distinction between the pragmatism of the Eisenhower forces and the dogmatism of the Taftians. The pragmatism of the Eisenhower movement is best represented by its concern with victory. It is not willing to embrace a dubious Cause at the expense of success at the polls. Stated thus, the distinction may seem to place principle on the side of Taft and mere expediency on the side of Esenhower.

It is here that we feel an additional comment is needed. The Eisenhower forces' concern with victory has led them to embrace a candidate who, far from being devoid of principle, represents principles to which the majority of our people probably are most responsive. Unquestionably, hundreds of thousands of Americans, including great numbers of independents, have followed Eisenhower because they share his belief in collective security. The conviction that the nation is in dire need of both more political morality and more political unity has also drawn a vast number of Americans to Eisenhower. Victory in a national election cannot be achieved apart from the beliefs and convictions of the people. Taftian dogma seems an ideological enclave in time, shut off from both practical prospects of victory and from the current thinking of the majority of the American people. The pragmatic cause is forced by its emphasis upon success to be the more truthful mirror of the current faith of the electorate.

Second Anniversary

Amnesia seemed to afflict many Americans on the second anniversary of the Korean War. It was about as phony as most cases of amnesia that are reported in the newspapers. There was a tendency on the part of many who have been making political or editorial capital out of the Korean reverses to suffer a complete loss of memory about why we went into the fight and about the almost universal acclaim that our action originally elicited. It almost seemed as if some of the critics had finally accepted the Communist assertion that the South Koreans had attacked North Korea.

Emphasis upon America's more than 100,000 casualties was widespread in the press, which reminded its readers that the number was greater than the losses suffered by the United States in the First World War. Over and over again "police action" was treated as something considered to be on the precinct level. Why police action on a world scale should imply something trivial we cannot understand. And many who were most shocked by the casualties of the Korean War were the loudest in demanding that the conflict be expanded to the mainland. How an expanded war, greatly increasing the risk of world war, would ease the casualty toll no one made clear.

There was also a great clamor for a "Korean policy." Demands for a policy always sound good, especially to us Americans, who are great ones for wrapping things up in a tidy package and being done with it. Such demands sound even better when the policy is outlined and makes some sense. Yet beyond suggestions for expanding the war or getting out of Korea entirely, there were no attempts to outline a plan.

What may well be wrong is the Administration's failure to enunciate its own policy—and the record—clearly. In June, 1950, overt aggression was answered immediately by resistance, as it never had been in the 1930's, when postponements and runouts eventually brought on the Second World War. Now a two-year halt to further aggression has been achieved, and in the tent at Panmunjom there has been a stalemate of aggression as well as of truce talks. Western Europe's military build-up, within the framework of evolving European federalism, has been hastened as it would otherwise never have been. If the correct policy is to fill the vacuum of free-world weakness, to discourage Soviet aggression, and thus to avert a third world war, Korea has been the greatest single agent to that end.

Of course, all the gains of our Korean policy can be lost if we fall behind in our domestic and collective military build-up. Here one of the great ironies has been that many who cry that we have no policy are the very ones who are slowing down the build-up, thus reducing the value of our Korean sacrifices. Such are the ones who oppose universal military training, who assist inflation by trying to remove economic controls, and who weaken our alliances by constant assaults against the good faith of our foreign friends.

The Open Seas

There are two things we are going to keep in mind during these days when the apparatus of American democracy selects candidates for the Presidency. From time to time we are going to think about a ship, the new *United States,* and about an incident, the State Department-Owen Lattimore mess. We are not going to overload the ship with symbolism, or the incident with meaning beyond its content. But the

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ship and the incident make a story which concerns democracy.

All citizens must be depressed at the sight of a great governmental agency making a fool of itself. "The department does not act on inanities," said the department's spokesman loftily when asked why customs officials had been alerted to bar Professor Lattimore from leaving his country without a passport. A few days later the department apologized: It seems that a Seattle travel agent had made up a lie.

It is a sign of the times, and a bore, that we should feel it necessary to remark at this point that neither the right or wrong of Lattimore's occasionally fatuous diagnoses of Far Eastern affairs nor his political bias is here at issue. The fact is simply that he is a man who has not been convicted of a crime. No legal indictment stands against him. He is an American citizen, undistinguishable legally from any other citizen. And he has been slandered. The department apologized to Lattimore for its error; it did not apologize to the rest of us. The rest of us, however, are deeply concerned.

When the new liner *United States* docked for the first time in New York, long lines of citizens eager to visit her formed along the waterfront. They were proud of her. And it is not literature—the call of the sea—to say that they were also moved by the sight of this modern mechanism that is as noble as the swift clipper ships of the American shipbuilding past. There were many there in the heat who knew that they would never sail down the bay with her to breast the open sea—there is the wife, the kids, the job. But there were none among them who had been taught to doubt that Americans have the right—inalienable save through due process—to travel when and where they please.

Playing Hooky

Of the seven Democratic Senators who did not take the trouble to vote the day the McCarran Immigration Act was passed over the President's veto by a margin of only one vote more than the required two-thirds, four are active Presidential candidates. Senator McMahon was sick that day, and we judge him less severely than we judge Senators Kefauver, Kerr, and Russell. We would find it much easier to think of these men as possible Presidents if they had met their responsibilities as Senators that day.

On the Republican side, both Senator Lodge, who is Eisenhower's campaign manager, and Senator Taft were absent because of the pressure of their outside activities. But of the six Republicans who were not present for the voting, the one we missed most of all was Senator Charles W. Tobey of New Hampshire. Both Tobey and Kefauver, who have risen to national prominence recently by saying pious things before television cameras, announced that they would have voted to uphold the Presidential veto if they had been present. Somehow we would have been more impressed with these two if they had taken time out from what we are sure they consider their more important work to appear on the Senate floor and actually cast the votes they say they would have cast. It was the votes that counted that day, not the intentions.

TIP TO CANDIDATES

Gentlemen, the voice you hear
Is the adviser's at your ear;
Mistake it never for the voice
That will express the nation's choice.

McCARRAN ACT

The blood that made this nation great
Will now be tested at the gate
To see if it deserves to be
Admitted to democracy,
Or rather to that small elite
Whose hemoglobin counts can meet
Requirements of purity
Consistent with security
And with that small and rabid mind
That thinks itself above mankind.

JUST ASKING

Oh, say can you see
In Syngman Rhee
The marks of a man of democracy?

U.N. DITTY

Sir Gladwyn is brilliant and Malik's resilient and Gross is indignant and blunt,
And they sit at a table entirely unable to hide their dislike and affront.

The Russian accuses, the Briton amuses, the American tries to explain;
The Latins rejoice in the sound of their voice and the Arabs are often in pain.

To endure the translations they scribble notations or fly to the delegates' bar,
Where they smile as they pose with their bitterest foes or uncover the latest canard.

But lest this odd picture be used as a stricture by those who belittle U.N.,
Let them save their advice for a better device and a body of cleverer men

Than Malik and Gross and Sir Gladwyn and those who perform most remarkable feats
Of holding off doom in a circular room by
simply
keeping
their
seats.—SEC

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CORRESPONDENCE

THE CRITIC CRITICIZED

To the Editor: In his review of my book, *The Future of American Politics,* Gerald Johnson (*The Reporter,* June 24) said a good many nice things but three points he raised merit some reply on my part.

First, to dispose of a strictly factual issue, Mr. Johnson states that my analysis of Frank Graham's defeat in 1950 makes "no mention of the fact that Bob Reynolds . . . threw his fifty thousand well-disciplined Ku Kluxers against Graham . . ." I made no mention of this "fact" because it simply is not a fact.

I checked the vote Reynolds received in the first primary with the runoff balloting in every county and precinct by precinct in the major North Carolina cities. The Reynolds vote did not swing as a bloc to Willis Smith, Graham's opponent.

The other two points are matters of opinion and therefore subject to legitimate dispute. Mr. Johnson doesn't like my estimate of President Truman but, after registering his objections, winds up quoting my own conclusion—to wit, that Truman's policies reduce themselves to buying time for the future and that if time has been in our favor, Truman will go down in history as a great President, but if it develops that time has been working against us, he will rank poorly in history.

My final comment is pointed to the new theory of American political parties which I projected. In this limited space I won't undertake to argue Mr. Johnson's objections to the theory, particularly since he does not seem to have fully grasped what I was stating. Probably I did not make myself sufficiently clear. In any case, apart from whether the theory is sound or not, may I restate its two main propositions.

First, except for relatively brief intervals, the pattern of American politics has not been that of two evenly competitive parties but of a normal majority party, which held dominance until its elements split, with a second, minority party whose strength rises and falls with the heat of the frictions within the majority party—much as is the moon's relationship to the sun. It was my further contention that the majority party served as the decisive arena of conflict in which the issues of any particular era are fought out. The dominant trends and forces of any period find their political expression in the elements in the majority coalition and propel the nation forward—whether for good or bad. The minority party, in contrast, becomes the refuge of the nostalgic political elements who are striving constantly to halt and delay the march of these trends.

Thus, the Republican Party today is essentially a part of nostalgia, seeking to pull back towards the past, even as was the Democratic Party in the period after the Civil War.

The second aspect of my theory is that friction is the cohesive force of an American political party. The reason American parties threaten constantly to fly apart but never do is precisely because they are coalitions of such antagonistic elements. Rarely will these hostile elements fly off *at the same time.* In fact, the defection of one element usually strengthens the attachment of other elements in the coalition.

SAMUEL LUBELL
New York

A BRICKBAT FOR TAFT . . .

To the Editor: Whatever the other limitations of Senator Taft may be, he can hardly be said to lack the ability to learn. There are indications that Taft has not only mastered new techniques of crowd appeal but that he has adopted a device from his colleague Senator McCarthy, something that might be termed the Big Accusation.

In applying this device the first rule seems to be that all illusions of complexity be eliminated, and then that an individual be made responsible—personally liable, as it were—for every national misery, foreign and domestic. In the June 2 speech from New York, for example, he repeated the now familiar theme that the Korean War is a Truman war, a war that "could have been avoided" (he never says how), as well as a war that we "could have won . . . if we had followed the advice of our greatest soldier, General MacArthur." (Ninth-grade Latin students will recognize this curious grammatical construction as "the condition contrary to fact.")

When McCarthy was first launching his anti-Marshall campaign, I wrote Taft to ask whether he planned to endorse this attack and where he stood on Senator McCarthy. In his reply of June 20, 1951, Taft evaded the question about McCarthy but went on to say that "as far as General Marshall is concerned, I think he has probably the worst judgment of anybody in government in my time." This is an interesting charge from a man whose judgment in foreign-policy matters led him to say on August 13, 1940, just after the fall of France, "We should not exaggerate the character of the emergency. I shudder to hear the words 'total defense.'" Taft's judgment also led him, if memory serves, to oppose the draft in 1939, the arming of merchantmen, repeal of the Neutrality Act, the "destroyer deal," Lend-Lease, implementation of the U.N. Charter, Point Four, and the Atlantic pact. The charge against Marshall is particularly interesting, coming as it does from a man who in February of this year regarded invasion of China by the Formosa Nationalists as the only way of stopping the Communist march through Asia, while insisting that it is folly to believe that NATO troops could do anything to check a Communist march through Europe.

Taft implies that for each of the disturbingly complex problems of 1952 there is a single simple remedy. But for the bad judgment of reckless if not evil men—Truman, Acheson, and Marshall—there would be, according to Taft, no Communist peril, no Korean War, no Red China, no inflation, and no high taxes. The alternative to the historical devils is manifestly the sane and even prophetic judgment of the three wise men—Taft, McCarthy, and MacArthur.

RICHARD M. DOUGLAS
Cambridge, Massachusetts

. . . AND ONE FOR IKE

To the Editor: A few days before Mr. Eisenhower's maiden speech at Abilene the letters column of a Washington newspaper carried an intemperate and uninformed attack on the striking steel workers written by a soldier in Germany. Reading it, I remarked to my wife that whatever else it proved it seemed to indicate that the millions of dollars spent on armed forces information and educational activities had been wasted if that soldier's knowledge of basic capital-labor relationships in the U.S. was typical of the Army as a whole.

Having read one or two *Armed Forces Talk* pamphlets on the subject, I felt that it probably was typical, too. For those pamphlets, to my mind, skirted the issues as gingerly as a scared government worker skirts around McCarthyism.

Then Eisenhower spoke at Abilene. And what he said there convinced me that perhaps those I.&E. millions had not been wasted. For one sentence in that speech could have been lifted intact from an I.&E. *Talk.* He said: "The settlement of disputes and grievances requires . . . a climate of good will, an appreciation of good citizenship, and responsible concern for all the people—and—most important—public confidence in the fairness and impartiality of appointed agents and agencies."

As in the *Talks,* there is no suggestion that the climate is sometimes hostile rather than benign, that good citizenship goes by the board when profits or higher wages are involved, that concern for all the people does not have high priority in wage negotiations, and that public confidence in appointed agents has nothing to do with a settlement.

Once we kept "cool with Coolidge." Shall we now keep "righteous with Dwight"?

JONATHAN CARMEN
Washington

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The Reporter

A FORTNIGHTLY OF FACTS AND IDEAS

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in this issue . . .

Not within memory have the Republicans gone to their national Convention with the choice they have to make more clearly defined. Since 1946, the gulf between the party's nationalist and internationalist wings has been widening; the nationalists, led by Senator Taft, have lately been gaining strength. Their challenge has been met by a popular soldier whose long experience in Europe has convinced him that we need allies and that those allies, to stand firm, need our all-out assistance. Ike or Taft? The G.O.P.'s choice is fundamental as its D- (for Decision) Day arrives.

(Note: The illness of Editor Max Ascoli has prevented him from writing an editorial for this issue.)

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

Which Road? The Chicago Choice

JOSEPH C. HARSCH

Is the Republican Party more interested in an ideological cause or in winning the next election?

In Chicago the men who march behind the symbol of the elephant must answer this question, and by the method of their answering they will probably decide their own fate in November, and very possibly also the shape and complexion of American politics for several years to come.

Two very different concepts of the function of a political party are involved in the choice the Republicans face between Robert A. Taft of Cincinnati and Dwight D. Eisenhower of Abilene. In Taft, the Republicans have a contender who reflects the concept of making the party the vehicle of a special social and economic cause with a definable philosophic point of view. In Eisenhower, they have a contender who reflects the contrary concept of the party's having the primary function of keeping itself in existence as an effective device for winning elections and serving the general public. The Taft concept puts the cause ahead of the party. The Eisenhower concept puts the party ahead of the cause.

With qualification, the distinction is between the continental European concept of the so-called "significant" party and the Anglo-Saxon concept of the pragmatic party. Under the "significant" concept, the party is only as strong as the cause to which it is tied. It rises or declines with the cause and goes out of existence if the cause dies. The pragmatic concept accepts or rejects causes as they may serve the continuing interests of the party and of the general public.

There is the subordinate question whether the Taft cause is the dominant issue in this election year. There are of course occasions in the United States, as there are in European countries, when a particular social and economic concept enjoys the support of a substantial majority of the voters. That is, there are times when it is sound strategy for the pragmatic party to tie itself to an ideological cause. Abraham Lincoln proved this. So did Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Both built powerful political combinations on ideological causes—Lincoln on the doctrine of the political integrity of the Union and Roosevelt on the social revolution of the New Deal.

If this is a year when a majority of the American people are in fact motivated primarily by a desire to undo the Roosevelt revolution, then it would be sound strategy for the Republican Party to identify itself with that cause and expect to ride to victory with it. In this writer's opinion, the composite mass of primary-election results, straw ballots, public-opinion polls, and popular political writing make that hypothesis invalid. Therefore I assume it to be true that if the Republican Party decides in 1952 to do in reverse what the Democrats did from 1932 through 1948, it will condemn itself to defeat. I take it as axiomatic that, other things being equal, a majority of voters would prefer a change of personnel in Washington and a shift of emphasis away from social revolution. But there is no impressive body of evidence to indicate that the majority desires counter-revolution.

Those Who Hate

There can be no serious doubt that the Taft cause in the Republican Party is more ideological than pragmatic—that it is more concerned with attempting to undo the Roosevelt social revolution than it is with securing the victory of the party. The evidence lies in the frequency with which Taftians say they would rather lose with Taft than win with Eisenhower. It lies in the Taftians' lack of interest in attempting to attract independents and Democrats to the party. It lies in the easy definability of a Taftian. Scratch a Rotarian, a member of a Chamber of Commerce, a member of the American Medical Association, and nine times out of ten you will find a Taftian. People from the more exclusive suburbs are for Taft. People who resist organization of labor are for Taft.

Equally, there can be no serious doubt that the Taftians possess a body

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of dogma which identifies them as a semi-religious cult. They hold it as a matter of faith that socialism is identical with Communism and that the New Deal is the first step on the road to both. They believe that Roosevelt sold out to Stalin at Yalta. They believe that the loss of China was connived at by Dean Acheson. They believe that the recapture of China is more important to the security of the United States than the holding of Europe. They believe that air power can satisfy our security requirements. These are all articles of faith, not capable of objective proof. The possession of a body of articles of faith is a first characteristic of an ideological cause.

Another mark of a cause is depth of emotion. Taftians tend to feel strong emotions. They have created their own hierarchy of saints and devils. Herbert Hoover and Douglas MacArthur are their patron saints. Roosevelt is the archdevil and Acheson is the extant limb of Satan. That they feel bitterness and even hate for their opponents is too obvious to require documentation. Only people who feel intense emotions against fellow citizens could produce the literature of hate against Eisenhower which has been flooding our mails.

Those Who Like

The Eisenhower case may be identified primarily by its contrast with the above. There is no such easy way of identifying an Eisenhower supporter as there is of identifying a Taftian. A lot of all sorts of different people "like Ike." There are some Democrats, like Paul Douglas of Illinois, who are sick and tired of the cynicism and corruption of the Truman Administration. There are masses of political independents who want a change in Washington, but not a radical change. There are workingmen who resent the "planning" and regimentation of the New Deal, but who don't see Taft-Hartley as the answer to their problems. There are rich Wall Streeters, and rich industrialists from the hinterland, who like Eisenhower for the practical reason that they think he is the best means of getting the Democrats out of Washington. There are also a lot of plain people of all kinds who just like his smile.

The very verb "like" gives us a clue to Eisenhower and to the feeling about him. To like is to have a positive and a friendly feeling. But the process of liking is a quiet one. It is only warm and friendly; it is not passionate. The antonym is only dislike, not hate. There is no deep or violent emotion engaged in the Eisenhower candidacy. People are drawn to him not because they feel violent antipathy to someone else, or passionate belief in his cause, but because they just quietly like a man who is inclined to be friendly and who only hates really "bad" people.

One of Eisenhower's favorite forms of relaxation has been the reading of Wild West thrillers. There is always a "bad" man in such stories, and it is the proper function of all "good" people to make common cause against the "bad" one. Ike is a sturdy fighter in crusades against obviously bad people. But they must be obvious and very bad for him to feel that he should draw his sword or his six-shooter. In the Wild West thriller, as in daily life, most people are good or at least are on the good side, and therefore are allies of the posse. And the posse doesn't feel hatred toward the "bad guy." It only regards him as an impersonal evil, like the rattlesnake, which must be destroyed.

Also, the posse happily enlists all good citizens in its chase of the bandit, horse thief, claim jumper, or despoiler of widows and orphans. It does not first inspect credentials to determine that the volunteer voted the straight Republican ticket from 1932 onward. Even an ex-New Dealer could be useful on such expeditions. Those people who desire to crusade only against the really obvious "bad guys" like Stalin, corruption, inflation, waste, and tyranny (all of which are impersonal evils) have seized upon Dwight D. Eisenhower as their chosen instrument.

Ike just doesn't feel it in his bones that this country either is or should be divided on ideological lines in an emotional civil war. He regards New Dealers as probably misguided, but not as conscious workers of evil. He thinks Roosevelt and Truman built too much centralized power into the Federal government, but he likes Harry Truman personally. He thinks Washington could probably have done much more than it did to save China, but he doesn't think Dean Acheson deliberately turned China over to Communism. He distrusts powerful labor unions, but because he has a primitive American distrust of concentrations of power of any kind, not because he is anti-labor. He is against compulsory FEPC, but because he dislikes compulsion of one American by another, not necessarily because he is anti-Negro or pro-segregation.

A man actually is known by his friends. Ike's friends are of all kinds. They include Senator Harry Flood Byrd of Virginia and a platoon or so of former enlisted orderlies, cooks, and drivers; Roy Cullen of Texas, who distrusts Taft's "liberalism," and Averell Harriman, who might be his pro-New Deal November antagonist; Edward R. Murrow of CBS and Cyrus Sulzburger of the New York *Times;* a million salesgirls and the aristocratic Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., of Philadelphia; Paul Hoffman, who steered the Marshall Plan, and many an Air Force general who thinks that any dollar not spent on preparations for the bombing of Moscow is wasted.

Men Around Ike

Who are Eisenhower's principal political advisers? The superficial answer is that he listens to advice from everyone who comes to see him. The true answer is that he takes advice from a group of people marked by two char-

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acteristics. First, they want to see the Republican Party returned to office this November. Second, they approach the problem from the pragmatic rather than the dogmatic point of view. Beyond those two distinguishing features there are many differences. Some are by inclination conservatives. Some believe in much of the New Deal. Most of them have no strong position on such matters, but, like Ike himself, think that the answers to specific problems should be the product of reason rather than of doctrine. They are dispassionate people.

Ike's adviser of longest standing is Kevin McCann, a big, boisterous, genial extrovert who is president of Defiance College in Defiance, Ohio, and who has been the General's principal speech writer from Pentagon days through the Columbia University and SHAPE periods. In politics as in life, Mr. McCann is an eclectic, with no perceptible bias, possessed of objectivity about his hero and just doing a professional ghost-writing and advising job for a friend who might well become President of the United States.

Next to McCann probably comes Arthur Vandenberg, Jr., son of the late Republican Senator, who approaches the problems of politics with the skill and calmness of his illustrious parent. Vandenberg and McCann together constituted the nearest thing Ike built to a pre-campaign "brain trust." Both visited SHAPE during the final weeks before Ike's emergence on the home political scene.

While these two men helped Ike work out his personal views on public issues, General Lucius Clay acted as his primary adviser on high-level personal strategy. General Clay had long since come to be Ike's closest and most trusted personal friend in the Army. It was Clay's advice that counted heavily in the decisions that kept Ike at SHAPE until the first of June, who counseled the strategy of being "available" without "campaigning" for the nomination. The Clay mind is as nearly ice as any the modern U. S. Army has produced. The ordeal of the Berlin blockade hardened him for last winter's ordeal of calming the anxieties of Eisenhower's political advisers, who veered between overoptimism and defeatism. When they argued that all was lost unless Ike came rushing home, Clay remained as unruffled as during the days when the fate of Berlin depended on a miracle.

Those who built the Eisenhower political movement at home were many, but two groups counted most. The nuclear alliance was formed between the leading Kansas Republicans and those of the populous Eastern Sea-

board states. The Kansas leaders were Harry Darby and Frank Carlson, helped by Roy Roberts, president of the Kansas City *Star*. The Eastern Seaboard leaders were Senators Lodge and Saltonstall of Massachusetts, the Dewey machine from New York, and Senator James Duff of Pennsylvania. In some ways these are disparate groups. The Kansans are as conservative by inclination as Republicans can be. The New York and Massachusetts groups are probably best described as Republican moderns. The rough-riding liberalism of Teddy Roosevelt seems to live in "Big Jim" Duff.

Experts in Survival

One quality binds the groups together. They are all men who evolved effective formulas for keeping the Republican Party in their regions alive against the repeated New Deal offensives. They worked out strategies and tactics that differed in detail but employed the same central principle. Out of experience, they became convinced that the Democrats could be defeated best not by fighting the New Deal at every turn but by taking from it what seemed to fit local needs and by blending those elements with time-tested devices such as reasonably good government.

They were all pragmatists, and they made pragmatism work. This meant a large dose of New Dealism in New York and almost none in Kansas. The proportions could be varied to suit local conditions, but the approach had to be positive rather than negative. The important thing to all of them was not dogma but "Does it work?" They are men who have won elections consistently by forgetting about the emotional issues of the New Deal period and concentrating on the business of attracting votes by serving the public.

Eisenhower is the ideal candidate for such men if for no other reason than that he has been both mentally and physically apart from the whole pattern of domestic torment over the New Deal. He has hardly known that it existed. Ike's America is the Midwest of 1910, which to him was as near to paradise on earth as any political society ever evolved. He had a happy, successful boyhood in a community that practiced equality of opportunity. He moved from that into a brilliantly successful career involving technical jobs that called for technical skill rather than a political or ideological point of view. If people back home got their emotions all involved in loving or hating Roosevelt, Ike didn't know anything about it, and cared less. He was always off fighting the obvious "bad guys" like Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin, and assumed that all the people back at home were part of the posse.

The Fundamental Difference

To a large degree, Taft is the product of Roosevelt. Had there been no F.D.R. and no social revolution at home since 1932, there could have been none of the emotionalism that makes Taftians feel like the victims of Sherman's march through Georgia. Eisenhower, on the other hand, is the product of having lived away from this whole period of American history, so far away that he didn't know that Robert Lovett and John McCloy were Republicans working as civil servants in a Democratic Administration, or that the Supreme Court had ever ruled against Texas on tidelands oil.

Thus, Ike came home a monumental enigma to both New Dealers and Taftians. They have been so absorbed in and obsessed by their rivalries that they find it impossible to comprehend a man who has no part in their world.

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To New Dealers, he sounds like a man to the right of Taft. To Taftians, he sounds like a man with no convictions. Both have been shocked by his lack of ideological perceptions, positions, and concerns. Both find it impossible to understand how a man can number among his personal friends both Harry Byrd and Averell Harriman. The essential point is that Eisenhower can, and sees no reason for not liking both men. Ike isn't mad at anyone except rattlesnakes and horse thieves and their kind, and he finds it extremely difficult to put any fellow American in that category. Eisenhower's background also makes it next to impossible for him to campaign against personalities.

Since Ike came home, many articles have been written purporting to show that in actual policy the Eisenhower and Taft positions are almost indistinguishable. Such writings miss the essence of Dwight Eisenhower. Ike differs from Taft not primarily on specific policies but rather on attitude toward people. If the Republicans choose Taft, they choose a man who likes and attracts one part of the American people and who dislikes and repels another and—if the elections since 1932 mean anything—larger part of the American people. If the Republicans take Eisenhower, they choose a man who feels an identity with most Americans and therefore suffers from a difficulty unusual among post-1932 Americans of being unable to divide his fellow citizens into two irreconcilable categories. To Ike, co-existence is possible between Democrats and Republicans, between New Dealers and anti-New Dealers.

Thus, it seems to me, it follows that if the Republicans choose Taft, they choose to perpetuate the mental civil war of the New Deal era. Taftians can't be blamed for a desire to do this. They feel that they have been the victims of one era of history and naturally they desire to reverse the pattern and get their own innings. Their desire to regain power is characteristic of the victims of all revolutionary periods in history. The refugee and exile always dream of a restoration and yearn for a settling of old scores. Usually there is an attempted restoration. But the pages of history have yet to disclose a successful restoration of the old order.

It would follow that if the Republicans choose Ike they will be electing him to pursue the role of the binder of civil wounds, of the restorer of civil harmony.

They would also be choosing to cut the "millstone" of the Truman Administration loose from the neck of a foreign policy of collective security. Eisenhower is the vehicle whereby the American people could have the foreign policy they have time and time again affirmed and approved, and have it free from the impassioned atmosphere of domestic civil war which has been generated at home over the New Deal issue and which would inevitably be protracted by a choice of Taft.

It really boils down to this: Do we Americans all join the posse to hunt down the really "bad guys" of the world, or do we divide between cattle ranchers and sheepmen and fight each other over local boundary lines, fences, and water rights regardless of what the "bad guys" may do in the meantime to both herd and flock?

The Republicans in Chicago will make that choice for all of us, because if they give priority to the local feud, then we must have our local feud, but if they give priority to the hunt for the horse thieves, then all of us can join the same posse.

'Availability'—the Magic Word

JAY FREID

In the curious lexicon of the American politician, "availability" has come to mean political appeal. Popularity symbols are the hub about which availability spins. Popularity symbols mean running qualities; running qualities mean votes.

Since a Presidential candidate must appeal to an electorate composed of many economic, social, political, and sectional groups, he will be successful to the extent that he can be identified with the most important of those groups. On the negative side, allowance must unfortunately be made for prejudice: Only one Catholic and no Jew has been nominated by a major party. Protestantism is a prerequisite because we are still a predominantly Protestant country, a historic condition that in 1928's recrudescence of Know-Nothingism was overwhelmingly reaffirmed in Al Smith's defeat.

Today military leadership weighs heavier in the "availibility" scales than it has in half a century. The record shows that there is a romantic focus upon military leadership and ardent fellowship—or perhaps "followship"—during a major war and the years immediately after one. Eleven of America's thirty-two Presidents have been military leaders. But though every conflict except the First World War has given us a President who was also a military leader, only the elections of George Washington, Zachary Taylor, and Ulysses S. Grant were specifically accolades for war leadership.

All the generals had enhancing democratic qualities without which mere military heroism would not have sufficed. Andrew Jackson, the Hero of New Orleans, was above all a frontier chieftain and agrarian leader of the rising new democracy beyond the Alleghenies which was beginning to challenge the political supremacy of the

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Washington

J. Q. Adams

Jackson

Van Buren

W. H. Harrison

East and its Presidential monopoly. The combination of log cabin, "Old Tippecanoe," and the 1837 panic elected William Henry Harrison in 1840. Franklin Pierce was a New Hampshire lawyer and Senator. Rutherford B. Hayes, James Garfield, Benjamin Harrison, and William McKinley were representatives of a general condition—men who had returned from the Civil War battlefields to resume prominent positions in national life as leaders of the party that had saved the Union.

As for "Rough Rider" Roosevelt, the Presidency first came to him through an assassin's bullet. Colonel Teddy's San Juan Hill charge was but an episode during a long career in practical politics, although his reputation for bravado certainly did him no harm politically. Winfield Scott, John Frémont, and Winfield Scott Hancock were also-rans. Hancock was a much more famous Union soldier than Garfield, who defeated him in 1880. Admiral George Dewey of Manila Bay and General Leonard Wood of the First World War coveted nominations they could not receive because they lacked political appeal. Dewey's remark, "It's easy enough to be President; all you have to do . . . is to take orders from Congress," was fatal, and the 1920 candidacy of the tycoon-backed Wood was blasted out of the Republican Convention as too "diamond-studded" by Senator William E. Borah, the Idaho fire-eater.

How to Be 'Unavailable'

When a man loses the qualifications for winning an election, he becomes "unavailable." Any known breach of integrity in business or political relations by a candidate, any departure from rigid standards of private and family virtue, can be a serious liability. Elastic ethics in government agencies had tarnished Mr. Truman's "availability" by 1952 to the point where they may have been a consideration in his decision not to run. Estes Kefauver was pushed out of a television screen into Democratic "availability" as the shining knight-errant who would slay the dragon of organized crime and governmental corruption.

In 1880, James A. Garfield's minor transgressions involving pavements were damaging, though his supporters insisted that wrongdoing was inconceivable in so homespun a candidate. Four years later saw the mutual vilification of James G. Blaine and Grover Cleveland. The charge that Blaine was Jay Gould's errand boy was matched with proof that Cleveland had an illegitimate child. A wit commented that if Blaine was a scoundrel in public office and impeccable in private life, and Cleveland—whose motto was "a public office is a public trust"—was impeccable in public office and a scoundrel in private life, the people ought to retire Blaine to the bosom of his family and elect Cleveland to the Presidency—which they did.

An association with big-business interests has also been a disqualification since Daniel Webster's hopes foundered upon his Bank of the United States retainers at a time when the Jacksonians labeled the bank the people's foe. Wall Street hurt John W. Davis in 1924, and Harold Ickes's epithet of "barefoot Wall Street lawyer" drew blood from Commonwealth & Southern's Wendell L. Willkie in 1940. Wealth barred Chauncey Depew in 1888, and impeded Hancock in 1880 through his millionaire running mate, William English of Indiana. Woodrow Wilson's 1912 delegate vote would never have nosed out Champ Clark's majority if it had not been for William Jennings Bryan's resolution renouncing support of anyone under obligation to "J. Pierpont Morgan, Thomas F. Ryan, August Belmont, or any other member of the privilege-hunting and favor-seeking class."

The candidate cannot be an obvious target for ridicule. The Jacksonian epithet "aristocrat" battered John Quincy Adams in 1828. The Whigs repaid the Democrats in 1840 with their comments on Martin Van Buren's lace-tipped cravats and use of perfume. Millard Fillmore was scarred by the tag "American Public Functionary." Horace Greeley's contradictory statements on war and reconstruction were dredged up against him with such venomous ridicule it broke his heart.

The factors that make for business success seem ruinous in a Presidential race. Magnates have played pivotal parts in the conventions as kingmakers, but they have had to surrender their hopes of becoming kings. The lawyer, the self-made man, the democratic soldier, the politician, the governor are the types that are selected. Normally the businessman must remain the power behind the throne or be content with a Cabinet post.

The little businessman shies from the thin-ice risks of a political career; the great one is "unavailable" because he would arouse the suspicion that the party behind him was in bondage to money. The influence of the businessman in our government is real enough, but it must seek to hide itself. Franklin Roosevelt compensated for his upper-class birth by becoming "a traitor to his class," as some of his Groton and Harvard contemporaries put it. In 1936 his Liberty League opposition proved the value of the right kind of enemies. President Truman hammered on this theme effectively in 1948. To his audience of average men, the "average man" in the White House was able to transmit the "I'm-on-your-side" personality of a people's champion. Everywhere Mr. Truman went he emphasized in homely terms the issues popularized by his predecessor, an achievement for which the press paid him belated tribute after the election. His speech in Chicago on October 25, 1948,

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was typical of his repeated identification of his opponents with the special interests, the power, oil, railroad, and real-estate lobbies. He repeated this line at the May 17, 1952, banquet of Americans for Democratic Action with his blast that "the Republican Party is the party of big business, and . . . would like to turn the country back to the big corporations and the big bankers to run as they see fit."

Fine Mantle, Slightly Frayed

The man who was right in 1948, Harry Truman, knows that the Roosevelt inheritance that was his main prop in 1948 would still provide great support for any Democratic candidate who could keep the Northern New Dealers and Southern conservative factions from splitting. Such a leader would be heir to the assets of the Truman international record but would not suffer because of its domestic liabilities.

Senators Richard B. Russell of Georgia and Robert S. Kerr of Oklahoma carry the Southern handicap that has been fatal since the Civil War. Their opposition to civil-rights legislation might lose them the Northern liberal and Negro vote. Kerr's oil money and links to natural-gas legislation are serious blocks. Senator Brien McMahon of Connecticut is Catholic. W. Averell Harriman is the captive of his wealth, which could be used against him just as Willkie's corporation ties were in 1940. He has attempted to compensate for it by yeoman work as an internationalist negotiator for the New and Fair Deals, and recently by courting organized labor, but he probably has too much money for his own Presidential good.

Governor Adlai Stevenson's popularity with the independent, liberal, and labor elements makes him the strongest potential Democratic candidate. A Stevenson-Kefauver ticket would be particularly formidable. In the absence of the former key figure, the latter has taken the "availability" limelight in the Democratic scramble for the nomination. Kefauver's primary jaunts have shown his ability to fill main-street appearances with the homely philosophy, quips, and rear-platform warmth that sold "human Truman" to the home folks in 1948. Further, Kefauver co-sponsored the G.I. Bill of Rights, is identified with the Kefauver-Celler anti-trust legislation, has supported TVA, housing, Federal aid to education, price control, and internationalism, and has opposed local rent decontrol, the Taft-Hartley Act, anti-strike injunctions, and the McCarran Act. His good showing against Russell in the Florida primary revealed that the Dixiecrats held little if any of the animus against him that has been focused on the President. And Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois is in his corner, accenting Kefauver's stand for honesty and integrity in government, his vigorous resistance to Soviet aggression, his support of collective security by the free nations, his opposition to private monopoly, his willingness to abide by Convention decisions on the civil-rights issue. Finally, Kefauver, like any Democratic nominee, would be the beneficiary of the twenty-year trend that has transformed the United States from a nation with a normally Republican majority to one with a normally Democratic majority.

The 'Available' Warrior

Only one Republican could siphon off a possibly decisive number of votes from the people who supported Roosevelt—General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the "availability" nonpareil of the hour.

Senator Taft probably couldn't make it. The Senator from Ohio has applauded Senator Joseph McCarthy, and while there are many who agree with him, there are probably just as many desperately needed voters who would vote for a Republican but not for a McCarthy ally. His paternity of Taft-Hartley would make him the target of hoary but effective "special-interest" accusations.

At a time when military leadership holds the spotlight, the two most publicized generals stand in great contrast to each other before the people. Hanson Baldwin compared them: "the one, Eisenhower, personable, warm and friendly; the other, MacArthur, a man of brilliant mind and authoritarian outlook." Among MacArthur's "availability" difficulties—his friendliness toward Southern views and leadership, his advocacy of internationalism in Asia and isolationism in Europe—is the fact that he is in the unbending-brass tradition while the Eisenhower presented to the wartime public was not.

Eisenhower's ability to be strong where the Republican Party must be strong, and where his party rivals are weak, was emphasized when the Washington *Post,* a liberal and internationalist newspaper, came out for him. His appeal is further enhanced by every news account characterizing him as a military leader who has exhibited brilliant administrative, diplomatic, and organizational genius, and as the chief executive and architect of Allied military unity. Obviously, the love match between Eisenhower and the people represents, to a large extent, support for what the man is rather than for what he advocates—for the most "available" candidate rather than for a party or for issues.

As men, the political heroes of America are just mortals, with wholly personal virtues and faults, but their myths are the social creation of our national feelings, our component hopes and hungers. The legends of our "available" heroes have come to resemble composite American ideals and folk aspirations. The beginnings of another such legend may now be spun before our eyes in the person of Eisenhower.

Taylor

Fillmore

Pierce

Grant

Hayes

Garfield

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What Liberty Means To Robert A. Taft

HENRY STEELE COMMAGER

LIBERTY, Senator Taft insists, is the paramount issue of this campaign. "I have never seen Republicans so determined . . . [to] bring to an end once and for all the system and the philosophy which threatens . . . liberty," he said in his National Republican Club speech, and again, with equal vehemence and vagueness, the "great issue [is] . . . to preserve the liberty of this country, to resume progress under the principles of liberty."

The argument here, as elsewhere, is elementary enough: Liberty has made America great; since the advent of the New Deal we have been losing our liberties and therefore our greatness; a continuation of the New Deal-Fair Deal philosophy and practice will lead to totalitarianism, the destruction of American liberties, and the twilight of American greatness.

If Senator Taft were not so painfully serious and if the issues were not so momentous, we might suppose that all this was said whimsically or facetiously. But—like that earlier champion of liberty, William Lloyd Garrison—Taft is in earnest, and he will be heard. Yet it is difficult to know whether to be more astonished at the first or the second part of the argument—at the assumption that we are losing our liberties or at the notion that we are losing our greatness.

If Senator Taft seriously believes that the United States is becoming a totalitarian country—a term which he invokes with alarming frequency—he should talk to politicians who have made opposition speeches in Perón's Argentina or Franco's Spain or Stalin's Russia. If he seriously believes that under the New Deal and the Fair Deal American business has lost its incentive or its energy, the people their prosperity, the nation its wealth, he should compare the American economy of 1930 with that of 1950. A ruined economy that boasts the highest wealth, highest income, highest employment, highest savings, and highest productivity in history is only less prodigious than a totalitarian government that allows not only Senator Taft but a five-star general still on active service to wage relentless warfare upon it.

Yet we can deny neither the sincerity of Senator Taft's animadversions about the New Deal nor the passion behind them, nor can we ignore the fact that the Senator's misgivings are shared by a large body of his fellow Republicans. What shall we say, then, of this ever-recurrent argument that since Roosevelt's accession to the Presidency Americans have been steadily losing their liberties? Before we can hope to understand the charge at all, we must consider what the Senator and his followers mean by the term.

Liberty is, of course, one of those words that can mean very different things to different people, and sometimes even different things to the same person at different times. Sometimes we are reminded of Emerson's outburst when Daniel Webster defended the Fugitive Slave Act as a gesture toward liberty: "The word liberty in the mouth of Mr. Webster is like the word love in the mouth of a whore." To Senator Taft, liberty is not a positive but a negative thing. It is freedom from interference—not from the interference of private corporations or associations, to be sure, but from government. His argument—at least during campaigns—can be reduced to the simplest of syllogisms without doing violence to its intellectual dignity: Governmental activity is socialism; liberty is the opposite of socialism; liberty is therefore the opposite of governmental activity. That this may seem excessively simple, excessively illogical, or excessively confused will not be denied, but it is what the Senator has said again and again during the current campaign.

Where Does It Hurt, Bob?

It is fair to ask here for a bill of particulars, for those who lose their liberties must surely be conscious of what it is they are losing. Precisely what liberties have been lost? What liberties have been curtailed? What liberties have been qualified? What is there that Senator Taft could say or do in 1932 that he cannot say or do in 1952? Can he worship as freely now as twenty years ago, or has freedom of religion been curtailed? Is he free to speak, in the Senate and out, or is he required to guard his words or to fall back upon a dubious Senatorial immunity? Is the press free to report his speeches, or has it been muzzled or intimidated? Is the party to which he adheres free to put up candidates and conduct a campaign—the kind of freedom not permitted in any totalitarian state? Are Republicans free to assemble in convention and to petition for redress of grievances? Is

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the Senator secure in his own person, and in his papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures; does he have available to him due process of law? Is his property—or that of his fellow Republicans—taken without due compensation?

But it is unnecessary to enlarge upon this. Clearly Senator Taft does not contend that these basic liberties guaranteed in the Bill of Rights are imperiled. Nor is there any reason to suppose that he is deeply concerned for them; if he were he would not be supporting Senator McCarthy. What he is concerned about is what the conservative wings of both parties have always been concerned about in recent years—freedom from governmental restrictions on the economy. He is for free enterprise and against any impairment of that enterprise. He is against excessive regulations, but does not tell us when regulations become excessive. He is against high taxes, but does not indicate the point at which they become too high except by a vague gesture toward a limitation of one type of taxation in times of normality. He is against centralization of power. He is against bureaucracy and regimentation and Presidential dictatorship. All this may be taken for granted. But it is in the economic field that he rallies his followers to resist invasions of liberty.

It will be readily admitted that the last generation has seen a tremendous burgeoning of laws, regulations, orders, and practices in the economic and social realms. In one sense all of these—labor laws, social-security laws, banking laws, farm-subsidy provisions, Tennessee Valley programs, and so forth—are restrictions on individual liberty, just as a forty-mile speed limit or a compulsory school law or a pure-food-and-drug law are restrictions on individual liberty and on enterprise. Yet when we contemplate the elaborate framework of law and regulation designed to maintain order and justice in our complex economy, we are reminded of John Locke's observation that "liberty of man under government is to have a standing law to live by."

Whose Freedom?

Actually, all of us are in danger of going astray when we discuss liberty, in danger of interpreting and applying the concept in a narrow and doctrinaire fashion. We would do well to keep

in mind Harold Laski's warning that liberty does not mean the same thing to all—to the Georgia Negro and the Georgia white man, to the unemployed coal miner and the coal operator. Nor is it irrelevant to recall that in our own history governmental interference with the alleged rights of some has meant liberty for others, and that the most spectacular example of government intervention in the American economy (and incidentally the most spectacular example of the exercise of inherent Presidential power) was Emancipation, which brought liberty to almost four million Negroes.

Even in the last twenty years it is probable that there has actually been an expansion rather than a contraction of liberty for the average man and woman. For the average American has more security than he had a generation ago, and it did not require Franklin Roosevelt to remind us that "in order to preserve democratic institutions we need . . . to prove that practical operation of democratic government is equal to the task of protecting the security of the people," or that "the first line of defense [for liberty] lies in the protection of economic security." The average American, Negro as well as white, workingman as well as employer, farmer as well as city dweller, has more genuine opportunity to develop his own interests, more real scope for meaningful private enterprise, than he has had at any time in the previous half century. He has more time in which to cultivate those interests, and more education to make the cultivation significant.

Even businessmen, even corporations do not appear to be suffering unduly from restrictions upon their freedom. Certain restrictions they have always had to recognize, the limitations inherent in the grant of a charter, for example; the limitation of "business affected with a public interest" which has been part of our Constitutional law for three-quarters of a century. Other restrictions have been added in the last two decades—such as restrictions on labor policies, on finances, on advertising. Yet elaborate as these are, they do not seem to have interfered very seriously with either production or profits. An economy that boasts a "permanent revolution" is scarcely a controlled or a frustrated or a defeated economy.

Yet, according to Senator Taft, the growth of Big Government flows from "totalitarian theory," and requires all patriotic Republicans to "bring to an end once and for all the system and the philosophy which threatens the existence and the liberty and the future of themselves and their children." Clearly then, it is not just misguided policies but basic principles that are at stake. We can presumably expect Senator Taft and his followers to repudiate the whole body of laws regulating the national economy, to return to the Jeffersonian principle that that government is best that governs least, to cherish Tom Paine's aphorism that "Government, like dress, is the badge of lost innocence. . . ." We can expect that if they come to power they will sweep away the whole "totalitarian" machinery and re-establish liberty.

Taft's Liberty in Action

What, then, are we to look for when the motley forces of the new libertarians, waving aloft the banners of Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner, capture the citadels of the government? Will they repeal the income tax, the most revolutionary of all measures affecting the national economy? They will, apparently, reduce it—if possible to a maximum of twenty-five per cent during times of peace; assuredly a pusillanimous compromise with principle. Will they repeal Social Security? But the Republican platform of 1948 called for an extension of Social Security, with increasing benefits to the old! Will they turn TVA over to private companies? If

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so, no word of this has leaked out as yet either to platform makers or to campaign orators. Will they repeal the bank-deposit guarantee, thus returning to the halcyon days of the 1920's when the nation suffered some ten thousand bank failures? Will they repeal the Securities Exchange Act, thus permitting the stock market some of that freedom it enjoyed in 1929? Will they abandon the whole socialistic program of farm subsidies and conservation payments? But the platform of 1948 called for a program of "sounder" soil conservation and the protection, by the Federal government, of "reasonable" market prices! It is worth noting, too, that in his "Answer to Abilene" Senator Taft committed himself to the continuation of the current system of farm-price support, and to Federal aid to education, housing, and security whenever the need for such aid was apparent.

The Real Threat

It is all very confusing. For if Senator Taft is prepared to accept almost the whole of the New Deal and to outdeal the Fair Deal in some respects, what happens to the great principle that was to be the major issue of the campaign, Liberty against Socialism?

And is the issue of liberty to go by default? It should not, for it is a very real issue.

No one who looks dispassionately at the American scene today can doubt that there *are* dangers to liberty, and that these dangers come precisely from the sources that Senator Taft fears—the attack on free enterprise and the overweening claims of the state.

For all his study of our political past, Senator Taft understands neither the principle of private enterprise nor the real nature of Constitutional limitations on government. The free enterprise that has been basic to American freedom, progress, and prosperity is not primarily economic but intellectual and moral. Free enterprise in economy is not antecedent to other freedoms; it is a product of other freedoms. Liberty is not something that may come as a result of free enterprise; free enterprise is something that flows from liberty. Freedom is not something we may hope to have if we have prosperity; prosperity is something we may achieve and retain if we cling to freedom. Where liberty has been destroyed, economic freedom too has been destroyed.

The attack upon free enterprise in ideas and the invasion by the state of the areas of intellectual activity are the major problems of liberty in our country today. Here it is possible to give a bill of particulars, though by no means a complete one: the limitation on voluntary association by the doctrine of guilt by association, and the use of blacklists of organizations that some governmental agency or branch thinks subversive; the effective denial of free speech by the threat of economic or social penalties for the advocacy of unpopular ideas; limitations on academic freedom by loyalty oaths, censorship, intimidation, and dismissals; limitation on political freedom by ostracism or even punishment of those who join unpopular parties or support unpopular causes; limitation on economic freedom by the establishment of "the American system of private enterprise" as a fetish and a touchstone that all must respect; limitation on freedom of movement by denial of passports and visas without provision for a hearing or for due process; limitation on the right of privacy by acquiescence in the exploitation of captive audiences by radio stations; the censorship of books, plays, and films by self-appointed religious or 'patriotic' organizations, and of textbooks by local and state educational authorities or veterans' groups; the denial of the right to work by self-appointed protectors of Americanism and morality; the deprivation of the rights and liberties of Negroes, Orientals, and, in some communities, Jews. The list could, alas, be extended, but it is sufficient to suggest something of the real nature of the problem of liberty in our time.

Where's Taft?

And where do Senator Taft and his fellow crusaders for freedom stand on these matters? "We've made our progress," the Senator has said, "because we've had freedom to think, freedom to try out new ideas." True enough, and we might reasonably expect the Senator to champion freedom to think and to welcome new ideas. Yet this is the man who has consistently supported Senator McCarthy, the very symbol of the assault on freedom to think and to try out new ideas. This is the man who opposed the confirmation of David Lilienthal for chairmanship of the Atomic Energy Commission, presumably on the ground that Senator Hickenlooper must be sustained. This is the man who regularly supported Congressional witch hunts, who has joined in the hue and cry against Acheson, Jessup, and others for tolerating "Communism" in the State Department. The Senator has been a very St. George in the contest against the Presidential usurpation of power, but in the most serious challenge of civilian power by the military since the time of McClellan, he rallied to the military, and the symbol of that challenge has now been chosen by his supporters to sound the keynote of the party. Ever zealous for free enterprise in the economy, he has been eloquently silent when freedom itself has been assailed. The work of vindicating those liberties inscribed in the Bill of Rights and in the heart and conscience of America he has left to others.

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'Let's Look At the Record'

GEORGE D. BLACKWOOD

Since 1938 there has been no regular majority in Congress on domestic policy, but rather three minorities —the Northern-Western Democratic bloc, the Southern Democrats, and the Republicans. In foreign affairs, there has been another fragmentation: The Democrats have tended toward unity, the Republicans toward disunity.

The recent emphasis on isolationism has obscured the G.O.P. internationalism that was notable for generations. The reciprocity policy of James G. Blaine, the Open Door of John Hay, the hearty backing by Elihu Root and William Howard Taft of the League of Nations' efforts to enforce peace and the World Court, and the activities of Theodore Roosevelt typified this outlook. The day before his assassination, William McKinley said, "Isolation is no longer possible."

By 1939 the internationalist tradition seemed to have been totally forgotten among Republicans. The majority of them in Congress voted against lifting the arms embargo, against Lend-Lease, and against further revisions of the Neutrality Act. The nomination of Wendell Willkie in 1940 marked the beginnings of an intense intraparty struggle that seems to be reaching its climax now. During the war, the Willkie-Dewey forces were in the saddle, and on April 20, 1942, the Republican National Committee announced that in the postwar era the United States had "an obligation to assist in bringing about understanding, comity and co-operation among the nations of the world." The Taft forces opposed the issuance of this proclamation, but lost. The Mackinac Declaration on Foreign Policy (September, 1943) also bore the Willkie stamp. More significant, the internationalist viewpoint found a Congressional leader in an ex-isolationist, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan.

The G.O.P. Division

Those who think of American politics solely in terms of the Presidency might assert that the Republicans have become an internationalist party, and that they will continue as such if General Eisenhower is nominated. But ninety-six Senators and 435 Representatives must be taken into account. The tendency of many voters to think only of the two men who are running for the Presidency results in misleading oversimplifications.

It is not entirely just to stigmatize the opposition to the Willkie-Dewey-Vandenberg-Eisenhower viewpoint as "isolationist." This term has of course been repudiated by Senator Taft, and perhaps a better word would be "nationalist," used by Colonel Robert R. McCormick's Chicago *Tribune* to designate the wing of the party that is dominant throughout most of the Midwest. This group castigates the rival wing of the party as "Eastern internationalists" and "me tooers," and stresses the need for a foreign policy devoted to what Taft calls a "frankly selfish viewpoint."

This year the Republican "class of 1946" in the Senate faces re-election. Elected in the G.O.P. upsurge of that year, seventeen men (out of forty-six Republicans in the Senate) are running for re-election, compared with fourteen of the fifty Democrats. One other 1946 victor, William Knowland of California, will be on the ballot, but having won both party primaries on June 3, is for all practical purposes re-elected. One incumbent, Fred A. Seaton of Nebraska, who succeeded the late Senator Wherry, is retiring, and Owen Brewster of Maine lost to Governor Payne in the primary.

The G.O.P. Senators in the race are: Williams of Delaware, Jenner of Indiana, Lodge of Massachusetts, Thye of Minnesota, Kem of Missouri, Ecton of Montana, Butler of Nebraska, Malone of Nevada, Smith of New Jersey, Ives of New York, Langer of North Dakota, Bricker of Ohio, Martin of Pennsylvania, Watkins of Utah, Flanders of Vermont, Cain of Washington, and McCarthy of Wisconsin.

An Internationalist Beginning

The course of Republican internationalism can be determined by a look at what has happened on the Republican side of the Senate in the six years these men have been in office.

In 1947, with the world in the throes of postwar adjustment, the Republican-dominated Eightieth Congress received a proposal to extend emergency relief to Austria, Hungary, Greece, China, Italy, and Poland. A House move to cut the appropriation from $350 million to $200 million was blocked in the Senate. Kem's motion to accept the House figure lost 64 to19, with only twelve of the forty-four Republicans present voting for it.

At about the same time, the two houses were debating the Truman Doctrine. Like many other foreign-policy issues, this was by no means clear-cut, but the debate showed that the temper of the Congress was internationalist. The bill passed the Senate 67 to 23; the Republicans voted in its favor, 35 to 16. Later in the year, the Marshall Plan began to take shape, and by No-

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vember an "Interim Aid Bill" calling for $597 million was ready for debate. Senator Malone moved to cut this figure to $400 million; his amendment lost 56 to 30, with a Republican count against it of 27 to 20. The bill then passed easily, 83 to 6.

In a few months, the full scope of the European Recovery Program was laid before Congress, with the Administration asking an appropriation of $5.3 billion. In a direct clash with Vandenberg, Taft moved to cut the figure to $4 billion (March 12, 1948). The motion lost, 56 to 31. The Republican score was Taft 23, Vandenberg 24. On the final passage of the bill, the count in the Senate as a whole was 69 to 17, the Republicans 31 to 13 for it.

The battle reflected a growing difference of opinion about Europe. The Senate Republicans have been fairly well united in the realm of Far Eastern policy, and they have generally stood together in demanding limitations on reciprocity.

Battles of 1949

Both factions kept their most important men through the elections of 1948, and the moderate internationalists received a notable addition—Margaret Chase Smith. But over the next few years, the internationalists seemed to slip a bit and lost a few contests.

The big struggle of 1949 was over ECA. Senator Wherry called for a fifteen per cent cut in the complex bill that provided $5.5 billion in the second year of the Marshall Plan. His motion was beaten badly, 68 to 14, with 24 of his party colleagues voting against it compared with 11 for. At the same time, Senator Taft helped move a ten per cent cut. This also failed. The count was 54 to 23; the G.O.P. Senators again voted against the cut, 19 to 14. The attempts to reduce the appropriation having failed, the nationalists tried a second technique: circumscribing the authority of ECA. All of the proposed restrictions were defeated, the Republicans siding, for the most part, with the nationalist faction in their midst.

On the final roll-call passage of the bill, the score was 70 to 7, with Senators Langer, Wherry, Capehart, Jenner, Kem, and Butler against the bill; Williams and Malone indicated that they would have voted against it. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization cleared the Senate without much difficulty. The test vote was a Wherry-Taft-Watkins reservation stipulating that no signatory be required to furnish atomic bombs or atomic secrets to another signatory. This lost by 74 to 21, with the corresponding Republican vote being 25 to 18. The treaty itself was ratified 82 to 13 (Republicans 32 to 11). However, the internationalist Republicans suffered a reverse on an amendment to reduce the appropriation by $200 million. Although beaten by 46 to 32, the cut attracted the support of 23 of the 33 Republicans present and voting. On the other hand, 19 of the 33 voted for the appropriation on final passage.

Spain and Point Four

Two touchstones of recent foreign policy have been the American attitude toward Spain and the Point Four program of aid to underdeveloped countries. In 1950, Paul Hoffman (now a chief aide to Eisenhower) warned Congress that including Spain in the Marshall Plan would have harmful effects in the rest of Europe. A vote to grant Spain $50 million failed, 42 to 35—the Republican vote being 21 for Spain, 14 against. Three months later the Senate reversed itself, voting the Franco régime $100 million from the general appropriation fund, 65 to 15. The Republican vote was 31 to 4. Even more important was the Point Four controversy; its inclusion in the ECA appropriation was the object of sustained attack. The Senate approved the program by one vote, 37 to 36. Eight G.O.P. votes were registered for Point Four, 25 against.

This vote, in the spring of 1950, seemed to mark a swing toward the nationalist pole of Republican sentiment. On May 5, three roll-call votes were taken to cut the total ECA appropriation, which amounted to almost $3 billion. The voting revealed an interesting crystallization of the Republican position.

Twenty-four Republicans sided with the majority to prevent a cut of one billion dollars; six Republicans were unwilling to cut even a half a billion; and three stalwart internationalists—Lodge, Flanders, and Smith of New Jersey—were against the final successful cut of a quarter of a billion. It was also known that Morse and the ailing Senator Vandenberg were against any cuts. These five Senators, along with Saltonstall and Aiken, who voted against the first two cuts, and Ives and Tobey, who voted against the billion-dollar cut, may be regarded as the core of the internationalists.

Another somewhat larger group voted consistently nationalist: Williams, Jenner, Dworshak, Kem, Wherry, Malone, Young, Ecton, Schoeppel, Capehart, Langer, Butler, and Bricker. On most of the amendments the moderate nationalists like Taft and Martin



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and the "switchers" like Ferguson voted with the intense nationalists.

The election of 1950 added several new faces, but the effect on foreign policy could not be discerned at once. The Senate got tangled up in the confused debate of April, 1951, over the power of the President to send troops to Europe without Senatorial consent. A series of resolutions came up, and the majority of the Republicans again leaned nationalist. Later in 1951, the President advanced the omnibus Mutual Security Program, calling for an appropriation of $8.5 billion. After the Congressional committees had cut the amount by about a billion, attempts to whittle it still further began. Senator Dirksen tried to cut the figure first half a billion, then a quarter of a billion; the first motion lost 41 to 31, the second squeaked through, 36 to 34. The Republican vote was 26 to 7 in favor of the first cut and 26 to 5 in favor of the second. A move to include Spain and Yugoslavia in MSA was beaten 38 to 29; the Republicans backed it 23 to 6. On final passage of the legislation, however, only five G.O.P. Senators voted against MSA.

In 1952, the most important foreign-policy measures have been the Japanese peace treaty (passed 66 to 10, March 10) and the omnibus foreign-aid bill (passed 64 to 10, May 28). The latter, set by the President at $7.9 billion and cut in committee to $6.9 billion, ran the usual gantlet.

The Republican division on the ultimate passage of the bill was 25 for and 9 against.

The Present Lineup

Given this six-year record, how do the Senate Republicans line up? On the basis of forty-one roll-call votes such as those cited above, we find the following (an asterisk indicates that the Senator is standing for re-election):

INTERNATIONALISTS (75%-100%)—8

*Smith (N. J.)	95%	Saltonstall	90%
*Ives	93%	*Flanders	88%
*Lodge	92%	Aiken	85%
Morse	90%	Tobey	83%

MODERATE INTERNATIONALISTS (55%-74%)—7

Duff	73%	Smith (Me.)	64%
Wiley	71%	Hendrickson	58%
*Thye	70%	*Knowland	55%
Nixon	67%		

"SWITCHERS" (40%-54%)—5

Ferguson	51%	Hickenlooper	43%
Millikan	45%	Mundt	43%
Bridges	43%		

MODERATE NATIONALISTS (21%-39%)—9

*Cain	38%	*Watkins	28%
*McCarthy	36%	Case	27%
Bennett	33%	*Martin	24%
Cordon	32%	Carlson	21%
Taft	32%		

NATIONALISTS (1%-20%)—15

Butler (Md.)	20%	Schoeppel	9%
Dirksen	20%	Dworshak	8%
Young	18%	*Jenner	7%
*Williams	18%	Welker	7%
*Bricker	18%	*Malone	5%
Capehart	13%	*Langer	3%
*Ecton	13%	*Kem	3%
*Butler (Neb.)	9%		

Thus, of these forty-four Republicans (with Seaton and Brewster eliminated), one-third are clear nationalists and another ten usually vote with them. One-third are clear internationalists or tend in that direction. Except on the final passage of foreign-aid bills, the nationalists are usually able to muster a majority of their party to cut appropriations and add restrictions. However, the Democratic tendency to vote internationalist has aborted the nationalist Republican moves.

What, then, is the Republican situation in the election of 1952? Six of the Senators whose seats are to be defended are internationalist-minded. Knowland and Flanders seem sure winners; the prospects for Smith of New Jersey, Ives, and Thye are good; but Lodge may have a difficult fight against Congressman John Kennedy. The other twelve contests involve Senators whose tendency is toward nationalism.

The main division in the Taft-Eisenhower contest is over foreign policy. Lodge in Massachusetts, Ives in New York, Thye in Minnesota—could they feel comfortable on the same ticket with Taft? On the other hand, consider the pronounced internationalist views of General Eisenhower, in contrast with those of Kem or Bricker.

A big Eisenhower victory might sweep in several of the men whose election now seems doubtful—such as Kem, Williams, Ecton, Bricker, Watkins, and Cain. Some observers feel that the departure of Harry Truman from the White House will mean a more cordial attitude toward internationalism in the Senate. This is doubtful, since some of the nationalists have extremely strong convictions.

If Taft becomes President, the nationalist sentiment in Congress will probably be strengthened, but the internationalists, combined with the Democrats, will give him trouble. If Eisenhower is elected, he may be faced with a supreme irony: The Democrats will have to be counted on to save his foreign policy from large and hostile segments of his own party.

Although the election of 1952 will turn on questions of foreign policy, the nation will witness controversies between nationalists and internationalists for years to come. The faces and names in Congress may change, but an internationalist President, no matter what party label he wears, will have to rely on the same kind of unsteady majority Mr. Truman has had.

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Trailing Illicit Gold Across a Hemisphere

H. R. REINHARDT

HONG KONG

ONE MORNING in the fall of last year, two Chinese met in the offices of a gold-bullion trading house in Macao, the Portuguese colony on the South China coast. One Chinese was the assistant manager of the gold firm; the other was a middle-aged gentleman named Wong, who is frequently seen in Macao bullion houses. Both wore pajamalike jackets and slacks cut from stiff black silk, and black cotton slippers.

The assistant manager told Mr. Wong that the company had sold four thousand ounces of gold to a bullion broker in Bangkok, Siam, for $184,634.27, and wanted the metal delivered. Mr. Wong said his associates would be ready to oblige for a delivery fee of $2.08 per ounce, or $8,320 in all. When the manager had agreed, Mr. Wong produced a checkbook from a well-known Hong Kong bank, made out a check for $184,634.27, and handed it to the other man.

"We will call for the gold in the afternoon," Mr. Wong told the bullion trader as he said good-by.

The assistant manager knew that, should the gold be seized from Mr. Wong's colleagues by Siamese customs men, the British bank in Hong Kong would promptly honor the check. He also knew that he was pledged to tear up the check and pay the transportation charges as soon as the Bangkok broker cabled receipt of the gold. The check was an insurance policy.

Mr. Wong knew that, thanks to the skill and foresight of his superiors, the odds were ninety-seven to three that the gold would reach its destination. He also knew that the fee he had just charged included a handsome margin which took into account the eventuality of encounters with customs men.

Golden Coffins

From Iran to the Philippines, harassed finance officials are fighting a losing battle against the skill and daring of Asia's gold-smuggling syndicates, five of which operate from Macao. In defiance of border guards, shore patrols, and customs sleuths, the men and women on the syndicates' payrolls handled an estimated $150 million worth of contraband gold during the past year. This wealth, which might have been turned into factories, railroads, schools, or hospitals for economically shaky Asian nations, has been diverted into private gold hoards and buried in golden coffins of various shapes and sizes.

I picked up the Asian trail of contraband gold last year here in Hong Kong after I had read a small item in a local newspaper to the effect that Hong Kong revenue men had seized over $120,000 worth of gold on a Norwegian freighter about to sail for Bangkok. It was the eighth such report I had seen in a month.

"Where does all this smuggled gold come from?" I asked a British official in the Hong Kong government. We were having a drink on his veranda and watching the sunset.

He pointed his pipe in a westerly direction. "Macao," he said. "Saigon, Bangkok, Tangier."

"And where does it go from here?" I asked.

He waved a limp wrist at the setting sun. "Same direction—Saigon, Bangkok, Bombay. Almost every ounce of gold that's bought and sold in Asia passes under the noses of our revenue chaps."

With this apparently absurd statement to go on, I plunged into a three-month investigation of the workings of the Golden Loop, the circuitous path that leads from North Africa to the coast of Red China, and back again as far west as India.

Tiny Chicago, Big Loop

Tangier, the internationally administered city in North Africa opposite Gibraltar, is the world's foremost gold entrepôt and as such the obvious starting point for any gold trail. Gold men regard Tangier the same way wheat and cattle men regard Chicago. But how and why, I asked myself, do Hong Kong and Macao, on the fringe of Red

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

Starworth

The Golden Loop

China, fit into the Golden Loop? I began seeking the answer in Macao. There is nothing furtive about the gold business in that tiny remnant of the Portuguese empire. Gold is imported, traded, and exported there with the express approval of the colonial authorities, and anyone who dares call a smuggler a smuggler can be sued for libel.

Portuguese friars still stroll through Macao's picturesque alleyways, past churches and convents dating back to the sixteenth century, when the Portuguese arrived and christened the settlement "City of the Name of God." Today Macao, isolated from both the mainland and its mother country, has become a city of gold, gambling, and prostitution.

While strolling along the Macao waterfront one afternoon, I saw a Catalina flying boat splash into the harbor. Police launches shooed off fishing junks from the vicinity of the plane, while ashore a cordon of heavily armed police blocked the approaches to the jetty, where an armored van was waiting. Presently, eight heavy crates were hauled onto the landing stage by sweating policemen, pushed into the van, and rushed to the vaults of the Banco Nacional Ultramarino, the Portuguese state overseas bank.

My inquiries revealed that the flying boat had just brought in almost twenty-five thousand ounces of gold from Bangkok, that two such deliveries are made each week, and that the Catalina was under charter to a small airline known as Macao Air Transport.

The gold had been transported from Tangier to Bangkok by a chartered DC-3 plane of French registry, according to an airline official I talked to later in Hong Kong.

"It's perfectly legal to fly gold from Tangier to Bangkok, and from there to Macao," he said. "As soon as a shipment of gold reaches Bangkok, Siamese customs men place it in a government-owned vault near the airport, where it remains until a few minutes before the Macao-bound flying boat is ready to take off. Of course, the Siamese customs needn't be told that perhaps the identical gold bars may turn up again in their country, a few weeks later, only from the opposite direction and less conspicuously."

"Couldn't I make a fortune by smuggling gold directly from North Africa to all those Asian places that get their gold in a roundabout way via Macao?" I asked.

"You'd *lose* a fortune," he said, laughing. "You see, smuggling is by far the most expensive mode of transportation yet invented. To move an ounce of gold legally seventy-five hundred miles from Tangier to here via Bangkok costs a little over a dollar. It costs more than twice that much to smuggle it back one thousand miles from here to Bangkok. To smuggle the gold directly over sixty-five hundred hazardous miles from Tangier to Bangkok, as you propose to do, would cost a lot of money. I can't tell you how much, because nobody has yet been fool enough to try it."

Doubling in Gold

I learned that the eight crates whose arrival I had witnessed were consigned to a four-man syndicate headed by Pedro Josefo Lobo, an unassuming little gentleman of Portuguese-Chinese-Malay ancestry, among whose many interests is Macao Air Transport. Senhor Lobo and his three Chinese partners are allowed to import gold into the Portuguese colony by virtue of having deposited $330,000 with the Macao government.

Ostensibly, anyone in a position to raise that amount is welcome to take out a gold-import license from the Director of Economics. The monopoly now held by the Lobo group seems fairly secure, however, largely because the Director of Economics happens to be Pedro Josefo Lobo, and also because the deposit must be made in Macao currency, which is so scarce that it is almost impossible to lay hands on $330,000 worth of it.

The Lobo organization imports about 200,000 ounces of gold each month for resale to bullion dealers. The profits of Senhor Lobo and his friends vary from $1 to $4 per ounce. For the 1947-1951 period, these "fees," as they are euphemistically called, grossed the partners some $24 million, of which the major share is said to have gone to Senhor Lobo. In his capacity as Director of Economics, Lobo is also in charge of levying an import duty of thirty-five cents per ounce, which goes to the Macao government.

In fairness to Mr. Lobo, local observers point out, it should be remembered that it was his vision and initiative which built up the Macao bullion trade from scratch, and that the colony's economy has benefited enormously therefrom. It is generally believed in Macao that both halves of the lucratively split personality of Gold

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Magnate-Director of Economics Lobo would suffer drastically if he stopped handing over a sizable slice of his profits to certain officials in Lisbon.

The Return Journey

After a Macao gold merchant has made a deal to sell gold to a bullion firm in Indo-China, Siam, Malaya, Indonesia, Burma, or India, he entrusts it to one of the big five Macao smuggling syndicates, receives a check like Mr. Wong's to cover the full value of the shipment, and the gold is ready to re-embark.

Macao's harbor has been allowed to silt up so that it can no longer handle seagoing vessels, and the colony has no commercial airport. But only forty miles to the east are the thriving harbor and airport of the Crown Colony of Hong Kong, within easy reach from Macao by junk or small steamer. Unwillingly and unwittingly, eleven airlines and about fifteen shipping lines provide free space for stowaway gold leaving Hong Kong.

This handy transshipment point has only one major drawback from the Macao smuggler's point of view: It is well guarded by customs men on the alert for smugglers, and whose keenness isn't lessened by the prospect of cash rewards equal to twenty per cent of the seized gold.

"Most of the contraband gold comes in from Macao by fishing junk," explained C.P.O. (for Chief Preventing Officer) Ernest Tuck, the stout, jovial Englishman who heads Hong Kong's fight against smugglers of bullion, dope, and strategic materials bound for Red China. A junk's average load of one hundred ounces of gold is usually hidden under a smelly, squirming layer of live fish. Since almost no gold remains in Macao, some 200,000 ounces of contraband gold enter Hong Kong during an average month, of which three per cent is seized. Considering that the Hong Kong customs service is confronted daily with a thousand or so fishing junks and some two thousand five hundred passengers who arrive from Macao aboard eight jam-packed coastal steamers, this represents an amazingly high score.

"It's more than just luck," Mr. Tuck told me. "Nearly all seizures are made on information. Our tipster may be a clerk in a gold firm who is out for the reward money, or he may be a member of a rival smuggling gang. These smug-

glers have their little wars sometimes, you know."

Mr. Tuck and two high-ranking officials in the Hong Kong government guard the tipsters' identities carefully. Occasionally, however, an indiscreet informer decides to share his secret with outsiders, in which case he may join the ranks of those whose reward is still awaiting collection.

Once in a while, a member of Mr. Tuck's staff goes treasure cruising in a customs launch, boards a junk, finds a gold hoard, and returns to his base with the junk in tow and counting on a handsome reward—sometimes up to $100,000. If he is an old hand at his job, he'll wait a few days before ordering a new car and/or quitting his job, for British justice, as dispensed by the magistrate's court in Hong Kong, extends the benefit of the doubt even to a suspected smuggler caught with the goods.

Don't Count Your Geese . . .

On June 23, 1951, a Hong Kong customs officer found 128 gold bars, worth about $30,000, aboard a tiny fishing vessel manned by a twenty-one-year-old woman and her fourteen-year-old sister. When the woman was arraigned three days later, she reminded the magistrate that she could not be prosecuted unless her intent to smuggle the gold into Hong Kong was proved. The customs officers, who had boarded the boat well inside Hong Kong waters, insisted that they suspected her of coming from Macao, but they had no way of proving it. The magistrate ruled that there was no case and ordered the gold returned. He then asked the beaming young woman how she had come into possession of so much wealth. "My father's lifetime savings," she answered primly. "Case dismissed," said the magistrate.

Less fortunate were six women who stepped ashore in Hong Kong on April 11, 1951, from the British-flag coastal steamer *Kwangtung*, just in from Macao. Acting on information, a customs detective was waiting on the wharf accompanied by a police matron, who proceeded to search the six suspects without finding any contraband on their persons. Detective and matron then went to work on foodstuffs which the women carried—strings of greasy sausages, baskets containing nuts, watercress, and ginger, and two geese gurgling annoyance at being cramped inside a wicker basket. The nut kernels turned out to be gold nuggets; the sausages bristled with gold; and when one of the fowls was shaken hard by its feet, it spat out four pieces of gold. In the washroom of the customs office, the throats of the geese were cut and their insides investigated. Goose No. 1 had sixty-two lumps of gold in its stomach. Goose No. 2 gave up twenty-six such golden eggs. Total value of groceries: $21,650.

Sold! To—?

No pure gold is allowed to change hands in the Hong Kong Exchange, for Britain is one of the forty-eight member nations of the International Monetary Fund. This United Nations agency, which has the objective of working for world-wide financial stability, believes that only "industrial gold," of less than ninety-five per cent purity, should be traded in open markets.

So, if you want to dispose of your gold in the Hong Kong exchange, you must first take the metal to Messrs. Kan Koam Tsing & Co., Gold and Silver Merchants. In a little kitchen behind the firm's modest premises in a two-story building on Queen's Road, gold of almost one hundred per cent purity goes into the crucibles and a carefully calculated amount of silver is added. The homemade smelter goes into operation, and presto!—you have com-

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plied with the International Monetary Fund regulations and may trade your bullion on the floor of the Hong Kong Gold and Silver Exchange.

On a typical business day, the fifteen-hundred-square-foot floor of the exchange holds between two hundred and three hundred screaming, gesticulating, and sweating clerks. When I visited the exchange, the temperature was up to 102, the humidity was something like 99.9 per cent, and the noise would have put Yankee Stadium on a World Series day to shame. Should you survive this punishment until the gold rates chalked up on the large blackboard opposite the entrance make you feel like selling, you simply raise a pencil high over your head and then brace yourself for an avalanche of perspiration-soaked traders, who will pounce upon you, tear at your clothes, shout into your ears, and wave sweating palms before your eyes. Finally you will sell—and it is not at all unlikely that the buyer will turn out to be the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China.

Red China, although not an important gold producer, is cashing in handsomely on the capitalistic game of buying and selling bullion and foreign exchange at a profit. Operating through such respectable Hong Kong bullion firms as Pao San & Co., the Peking government uses its surplus foreign-trade funds for fliers in gold, U.S. dollars, and Swiss francs. The agents of the Chinese Communists in the foreign-exchange and bullion markets here are not tight-lipped commissars who lead austere lives and read Marx and Mao after office hours. They are shrewd bullion operators of many years' standing, who own Cadillacs, Packards, and Lincolns, patronize the best English tailors in town, and probably are as staunch believers in capitalism as their counterparts in Wall Street and Lombard Street. The Chinese Communist government merely finds it expedient to use their skill and their many useful contacts.

If it is a Hong Kong goldsmith, rather than a representative of Peking, who has acquired your "industrial gold" on the exchange, he must promptly take the metal back to Messrs. Kan Koam Tsing & Co. to have it reconverted. Asian people like their ornaments of the purest gold available, usually 99.7 per cent. On the second floor of the Kan establishment, the gold bars will

be suspended in large glass tanks filled with a solution of sulphuric acid, a current will be passed through them to precipitate the silver to the bottom of the tanks, and the resultant metal will be just as unsalable on the exchange as it was in the first place.

Transient Bullion

Only a small fraction of the estimated 200,000 ounces of gold which enter Hong Kong from Macao each month finds its way into the gold market via the kitchen of Messrs. Kan Koam Tsing & Co. To the smuggling syndicates, Hong Kong is essentially a port of transit. The smuggler ships gold from Macao to Hong Kong at an expense of ninety-two cents an ounce solely so that he can entrust the gold here to his European and American hirelings for conveyance along the next stretch of the Golden Loop. These hirelings include American pilots, British air hostesses, and Scandinavian sailors. Their pay is modest—often as little as a dollar for taking an ounce of gold as far as India, where it fetches on the average eight dollars more than it would in Hong Kong.

When gold enters Hong Kong from Macao, it becomes contraband. When it leaves Hong Kong, it is prepared for the longest stretch of its westbound trip, in the hold of a ship or the fuselage of a plane. Before the gold reaches its final destination in Asia, it may have to change to a bus or a train. But this is a minor operation, safe for the carrier, because by that time he has cleared the customs hurdle into his country of destination, and, strictly speaking, it has ceased to be smuggler's gold.

The smugglers' feud of 1950, with its anonymous tips and the mysterious disappearance of some tipsters before they could collect their reward money, was actually a minor aspect of a battle royal waged on a higher level of the Asian hierarchy of gold, for stakes running into tens of millions of dollars.

Cocksure, and with very heavy financial backing, a group of Shanghai speculators entered the Hong Kong gold market in the summer of 1949. Shanghai had just fallen to the Reds. Since the gold men had as a matter of course kept an eye on the Hong Kong market for years, they decided to set up headquarters in the British colony. Their funds were so enormous that they were about to corner the market. Then there came a closing of ranks among three cliques of South China gold men who had run the Hong Kong exchange for generations in a spirit of friendly competition.

There were surprise maneuvers by both sides, with large gold hoards dumped on the market and withdrawn just as suddenly. The quotations on the blackboard at the Gold Exchange went wild. The newcomers hung on despite many sickening lurches, throwing in every ounce of gold they had. By the early summer of 1950 they had lost $83,500,000, and by July of that year they had given up. Subsequently there were suicides in the plush apartment houses on Macdonnell Road, and several expensive bungalows at scenic Repulse Bay were put up for sale.

When the Communist régime in Peking discovered the possibilities of the Hong Kong gold market at about that time, the Red leaders were careful not to send down their own men from the north. So the three original South China cliques have now been joined by a fourth clique—the "Communist clique." It grew out of the other groups when certain operators were entrusted with official Chinese Communist funds, which they handle very circumspectly.

The Golden Loop handles roughly two-thirds of the contraband gold pouring into Asia. Much of this reaches India. However, some 100,000 ounces per month enter India over a direct feeder line from Tangier which terminates at two small, Macao-like colonial remnants on the Indian coast.

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The French settlement of Pondichéry and the Portuguese colony of Goa are conveniently located outside the jurisdiction of Pandit Nehru's gold-conscious customs sleuths. Still, India continues to receive a fair share of its gold imports via the circuitous Golden Loop, because before contraband gold can be delivered from Goa and Pondichéry to the flourishing gold market at Bombay, it has to get past the Indian customs, and this operation has become so risky of late that smugglers in Pondichéry and Goa charge "transportation fees" of up to $3 an ounce. The masters of the large-scale, efficient machinery of the Golden Loop actually charge less than that for delivery from Macao to points on Indian territory.

The direction and extent of the flow of gold in Asia are determined, of course, by price differences in the various markets. When these differences are negligible, business may be at a standstill for days.

A Long Way from Fort Knox

The United States plays an aloof but decisive role along the Golden Loop. On the one hand, the United States is violently opposed to free gold markets, officially ignores them, and doggedly continues to sell gold from its Fort Knox hoard to friendly governments at the 1934 price of $35 an ounce. The official U.S. view is that the proper job of gold nowadays is to bolster currencies and to buttress feeble economies, and its proper place is in the vaults of state banks rather than in private hoards. On the other hand, U.S. stockpiling of raw materials has placed in the hands of European and Asian businessmen large numbers of U.S. dollars, the currency that forms the basis of all gold sales. Not only is there no longer a dollar famine abroad, but the drop in the purchasing power of the dollar since Korea has induced more and more Europeans and Asians to sink their American money into old-fashioned gold bars, thus feeding dollars into the free gold markets of which Washington economists so heartily disapprove. Macao and Hong Kong, for example, provide golden coffins for the fabulous tin and rubber profits made since Korea in Siam, Malaya, and Indonesia, where the United States is the chief cash customer.

Soviet gold has not figured to any appreciable extent in world markets, even though the U.S. Bureau of Mines estimates that the gold production of the U.S.S.R. is second only to that of South Africa, which would give the Kremlin a formidable weapon with which to dislocate free-world economies. Economists point out, however, that the Soviet Union has enough foreign-exchange assets to pay for its limited imports from hard-currency areas without having to dig into the Russian gold pile. Besides, if the Russians were to dump gold in world markets, they would actually be doing the United States a favor by driving down the sky-high free gold prices, which our fiscal experts consider so dangerous.

There is rich man's gold and poor man's gold; gold in bars, bangles, rings, and nuggets; gold of all shapes, sizes, and degrees of purity. The Asian terminals of the smuggling circuits gobble it all up—$150 million worth a year. The ultimate customers are farmers, workers, shopkeepers, merchants, industrialists, and government officials. Age-old custom teaches them to put their trust and their savings in gold, and their forebears' faith in gold has been amply vindicated by the military and political upheavals of the past forty years. Worldwide inflation and the uncertainties bred by the cold war have further stimulated the scramble for gold. Traffic on the Asian gold-smuggling trails has doubled since Korea. Confidence in government-issued paper money and in the future is at an all-time low among the people east of Suez.

The Poison of Gold

Meanwhile savings which could be productively invested by banks lie idle; paper money is snubbed for gold, depreciates with every rise in the gold price, and becomes a weaker and weaker factor in national economies. U.S. dollars that could buy vital imports or help to strengthen tottering Asian currencies are sucked out through the Golden Loop.

Unless the prospects for peace and economic stability take a drastic turn for the better, the Asian smuggler can look forward to a long golden age. For behind the golden tide lies fear—the fear of millions of people desperately seeking to protect their savings.

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Nigeria: Exit the Empire, Gracefully

ODEN and OLIVIA MEEKER

NIGERIA is probably the largest, richest, most complicated unborn country on earth. Its Governor, Sir John Macpherson, is in attendance as Britain's most highly qualified political midwife. Both Nigeria and its neighbor to the west, the Gold Coast, will emerge in the fairly near future as sovereign states—either in or out of the British Commonwealth, as they choose. Both have recently been granted internal self-government, and they are now earnestly trying to prove that Africans can run their own show without lapsing into the chaos so freely predicted for them.

A great many people hope the West Africans will fail. Success or failure will have profound repercussions on Malan's South Africa, on the French territories, on the racially wavering East African countries, and throughout the colonial world.

A former Nigerian administrator, Walter Russell Crocker, has written in his perceptive comparative study *On Governing Colonies*: "Catastrophic forces have been let loose upon [the Africans] which can be compared to telescoping into one age the Renaissance, the Reformation, the French Revolution, the Industrial-Agricultural Revolution, and the Bolshevik Revolution, and then to exploding this amalgam over the fifth- and sixth-century Saxon chiefdoms in England."

Mr. Crocker did not exaggerate. In the great, sprawling, brown, tin-roofed tropical port of Lagos, able African Ministers with European secretaries direct large government departments, and African legislators meet in a strikingly handsome tropical-modern House of Representatives. There are normally only three Europeans in the usual Cabinet meeting of twelve, but outside in the streets are juju men covered with bright feathers, mirrors, shells, and magical amulets, accompanied by drummers and bands of faithful fetishists. The great west coast trading companies—French, British, Swiss, and Syrian—are all here with their imports and exports and garages and general stores. The United Africa Company, which is a branch of Lever Brothers, alone sells a hundred million square yards of cloth a year along the coast, and in Lagos maintains an elegant department store with uniformed doormen, a catering service, and the latest novels from London.

Tight Timetable

The Cabinet member is more typical than the magician. But he faces a difficult job over the next five years, the time many politicians here estimate may be necessary to achieve full Dominion status, with Nigerians in control of defense, civil service, and foreign affairs. The country is divided into distinct Northern, Eastern, and Western regions, each jealous of the others, and it has so far failed to produce any leaders on a truly national scale.

Photos by Griff Davis from Black Star

Sir John Macpherson

There are possibly twenty-five million Nigerians, though this may be a patriotic estimate. In any case Nigeria is Britain's largest colony, and from the standpoint of natural resources, one of its wealthiest—potentially, prodigiously so. In a desperately poor and sparsely settled continent, Nigeria is comparatively rich and overpopulated. It produces cocoa, palm oil and kernels, peanuts, timber, coal, and columbite, and it exported enough fats to Britain last year to give every inhabitant of the United Kingdom a cake of soap and a quarter pound of margarine. Most Nigerians are small peasant proprietors, living mainly on forest products. Palm trees alone produce roofs, walls, mats, cooking oil, salad, coconuts, fuel, and the excellent frosty-pink drink of the country, palm wine.

Nigeria stretches inland from the Gulf of Guinea. On the map it's a large, irregular pink blotch on the under side of the West African bulge. The old British coin takes its name from this coast, as do the guinea fowl and guinea corn (but not the guinea pig, which is a misnamed immigrant from the Guianas). The shore west of the Niger Delta is part of the old Slave Coast; it was Britain's effort to suppress the slave trade that led it to set up a base at Lagos and proclaim a colony there just a century ago. This was the White Man's Grave, where fever and dysentery sometimes accounted for more than half of the troops and traders and missionaries soon after their landing.

Nigeria is tremendously diverse; one is acutely aware of the vast and various hinterland. Lagos itself has a population of 232,000, while Ibadan, one of the provincial centers, has an estimated

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Immunized children and . . .

400,000, which makes it the largest city between Johannesburg and Cairo. There are sea cows in the estuaries, tropical butterflies everywhere, elephants, leopards, pigmy hippopotami, warthogs, bug-eyed lemurs, antelopes, mambas, chimpanzees, and gorillas. Bashful naked pagans live in the northern hills, secure in caves among the rocks. To the east, in the U.N. trust territory of the Cameroons, is the world's largest frog, *Rana goliath,* with hind feet nearly as big as a man's hand.

The Capital

Lagos is a ramshackle town, superficially undistinguished. Tinubu Square, the center of the capital of Nigeria, looks like just another intersection. Record stores play the usual American hillbilly songs, and in the gardens are the same immigrant flamboyants, hibiscus, frangipani, and bougainvillaea, and breadfruit, mango, and papaya trees that are now scattered throughout the tropics. The lingua franca is a variety of pidgin English: *dash* (tip), *chop* (food), and *one-time* (quickly). As on the Gold Coast, busses and taxis are apt to be named *Son of the Elephant No. 1, Let Them Say,* or *Prepare to Meet Thy Maker.*

Yet Lagos somehow *feels* different from the other cities. It has a left-handed charm of its own. People are extremely courteous. There is a certain amount of sounding off against "expatriates" and "imperialists" by Nigerian politicos, and some of the pettier Europeans here seem to find their only relief from the heat in blowing up their African subordinates, but there is a remarkable absence of the racial tension one would expect in a country that has been agitating for its independence for some time. The Island Club, which has a large and jovial interracial membership, is an effective answer to the all-white country clubs which have become a symbol of colonial privilege elsewhere.

North to the Sahara

Behind the ten to sixty miles of coastal swamp come fifty to a hundred miles of higher rain forest, full of oil palms; then the great arid expanse of the Northern region, cooler as it rises toward the Sahara. In the north there are camel trains, massive cities of mud brick "where every building looks a thousand years old as soon as it is finished," and some ten million conservative black Moslems, who look to the Arab world rather than to Europe.

The northerners are mainly Hausas, and the ruling Fulanis who were just finishing off their invasions of the Hausas when the British came. Both tribes are aloof, poor but not destitute, wandering traders and small peanut farmers, herders of goats and of long-horned, dewlapped zebu cattle. They cling to their autocratic emirates, are sensitive about their relative backwardness, and worry lest the quicker, better-trained minority in the Eastern and Western Provinces will dominate the new state before they have a chance to catch up.

The Northern Provinces account for some two-thirds of Nigeria. The Western Provinces take in the cosmopolitan capital of Lagos and the largely Yoruba sections full of peasants who, like the southern Italians, prefer to live in towns and travel considerable distances out to their farms. In the west is also the ancient walled city-state of Benin, separatist, preoccupied with ritual and juju, and heir to a non-Yoruban civilization which was casting its own handsome bronze sculptures as early as the fifteenth century.

The Yorubas, who have a comparatively high standard of culture and education themselves, have been quick to adapt themselves to European ways. Their strongest political party is the Action Group, led by Obafemi Awolowo, whose book, *Path to Nigerian Freedom,* published five years ago in London, is an exceptionally skillful and literate presentation of the case for Nigerian independence.

In the east live more than three million Ibos, a people who are, according to the *Times* of London's appraisal, "probably the most hard-working, violent and progressive tribe in Africa." Theirs is an even hotter, moister country, ending in the misty purple foothills of the mountains of the Cameroons.

Ibos are individualists with a touch of anarchy in their hearts. Most government is traditionally on a family level, and the small clan is the biggest political unit. Indirect rule, Lord Lugard's system of governing through established local institutions, doesn't work well here. Community planning and British County Council arrangements look more promising for the future.

Nationalistic Measles

Sectional stresses and strains are felt in the capital, where the House of Representatives, composed of representatives from the three regional legislatures, meets. In 1948, intertribal animosity in Lagos reached such a pitch that all meetings and parades had to be banned. There is little extremism of the Middle Eastern variety in town. Few people cry for the heads of the British, or suggest throwing them into the sea. But at a time when all sides are agreed on the country's need for unity, a remarkably free-wheeling press and some of the less responsible politicians are not above making political capital out of the regional rivalries.

The Cabinet and House are learning to run Nigeria by running it. Certain Cabinet Ministers we talked to thought



. . . enfranchised adults

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Nigeria might be ready for independence in a couple of years if not right away. But Mr. M. A. T. Belewa, the Minister of Works, a bearded, slow-spoken, thoughtful northerner who used to be an education officer in one of the emirates, echoed the fears of his region when he said, "We need more time. . . . Many of us feel the pace of evolution is too rapid for the north. If the country were given independence now, it would mean handing over one region to the others."

'Zik' and the Fourth Estate

The east is the stronghold of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe—"Zik" to Nigeria—for many years the most important of the agitators for Nigerian independence, and now head of a party called the N.C.N.C., or National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons, which also has a moderately large following in Lagos itself.

Dr. Azikiwe is still the most striking political figure in this divided country, and though he is not a member of the present Cabinet, his influence is widely felt through the *West African Pilot* and other papers he controls throughout the country. Like the Gold Coast Prime Minister, Kwame Nkrumah, Zik was educated at Lincoln University in Pennsylvania, and he went on to take his M.A. in political science at Columbia. Zik also worked on the Gold Coast, editing a newspaper in Accra and once being charged and convicted of sedition there for an inflammatory nationalist editorial. (The conviction was later reversed.) Lately he has been somewhat eclipsed in the international eye by the spectacular rise of Nkrumah in the Gold Coast, but if Zik seems to have lost a little of his old political appeal, he is by no means through.

Zik keeps himself isolated and guarded these days, seeing few people, and some of his friends think that because of this he may have lost some of his masterly sensitivity to the Nigerian popular pulse. He also seems a little removed from reality when it comes to international affairs. "We must turn to America, but at the same time we must do nothing which would offend the U.S.S.R.," he has said. "Nigeria has ninety-five per cent of the world's supply of columbite. If the U.S., with the opportunities presented to her, fails to appreciate us, we'll turn to any other nation, we'll go to the other extreme."

The Oba of Benin

This implied blackmail probably shouldn't be taken any more seriously than the political cartoons in Zik's *Pilot,* in which Governor Macpherson, usually labeled IMPERIALIST, is shown selling Nigeria down the river. Or those in the rival *Daily Service,* in which a figure representing Zik's party and labeled JUDAS ISCARIOT is shown giving away Nigeria's bags of wealth to a posse of gun-toting, bandana-masked cowboys identified as FOREIGN CAPITALISTS.

Some of the news stories come from Tass, the Soviet news agency, but far more frequently they are handouts from the United States Information Service: news of progress made by Negroes in the United States, texts of radio talks by local American consular officers, and even an occasional engraving of the Statue of Liberty. This material is not received without a certain skepticism. Nigerians dream of traveling to America to work or study, but the United States has not yet lived down its reputation—even among well-traveled and educated Englishmen in these latitudes—for heavy discrimination against Afro-Americans.

The Nigerian press has the advantage over newspapers in the French, Belgian, Portuguese, Spanish, and Liberian territories in that it is able to say what it thinks of the Government—even if sometimes this takes pretty crude forms. Patrick O'Donovan, the perceptive reporter of the London *Observer,* has said of the Nigerian press that "it does not present an insurmountable hazard for the new State. It is likely . . . that the people will learn that sturdy disrespect for journalism that older States know."

Nigerian papers still depend for a good part of their revenue on ads for dream books, super worm expeller, fertility tablets, and Damaroids—"The Great British Rejuvenator." Even the United Africa Company peddles a product known as Power Pills. West Africa Publicity (another Unilever affiliate) presents comparatively attractive advertising specifically tailored for the new African market: Roy Ankrah, the Gold Coast boxer, is quoted as saying, "You, too, will like Kolynos," and Elsie the Borden Cow is on hand to recommend Klim powdered milk for African babies. Africans are shown getting better jobs with Marmite yeast extract under their belts, winning that diploma with Ovaltine, speeding away from a lion on a Hercules bike, and drinking Guinness in the apotheosis of middle-class comfort.

Zik's papers used to print imaginary dialogues with the Governor beginning "Hello John!", and both Zik and Macpherson seem to entertain a cheerful respect for each other outside of office hours.

Sir John

"Nothing can hold the Nigerians back. The northerners are a little way behind now, but all they need is the abracadabra of western education. They've got guts and they've got discipline," Macpherson said to us one day in Government House, doodling on his blotter with violet ink. "We took a hell of a gamble. We might have waited five years before this new constitution and concentrated on building up local self-government.

"Some people said it was impossible to bring the north and the south together. But there wasn't time for all this caution. We had to keep up with the rest of the world. In the end it came out roughly as we had hoped, and we didn't rig it at all. There were fifty-three chaps—fifty Africans and three Europeans—at the General Constitutional Conference at Ibadan."

Sir John, a supple-minded, gregarious type, is impressively handsome in his gold-braided dress uniform with its stand-up collar and his white colonial helmet with tall egret plumes. Sir John

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himself operates in a disarmingly open manner, seeing almost everyone who comes along. His routine is a welter of luncheons, dinners, Cabinet Ministers, house guests, legislators, and reports, but he manages to bounce through it all with an enthusiasm that seems at times more American than British.

Unlike some of the Duralumin characters who keep turning up in *Time*, apparently living on will power and four hours' sleep a night, Macpherson needs his full seven hours. He trained first in Malaya, later in Palestine, learning to anticipate trouble and to channel it if possible. He did a good job as head of the British Point Four-like Development and Welfare program in the West Indies. Now, as Governor of Nigeria, Sir John sits close to the top of the colonial tree.

Macpherson describes extreme nationalism as "a kind of measles" and adds the observation that measles is seldom fatal in the young. Of the highly regional setup which the present character of Nigeria imposes, he says, "It's a tricky knife-edge. A delicate balance is required. It's a question of giving the Regions the autonomy that is necessary without giving so much that the centrifugal force becomes too great." On Nigeria's future his most typical comment is, "Please God we do it right."

The Communist Effort

So far, Macpherson and his Government have banned only one Communist publication (a World Federation of Trades Union pamphlet which called for violence), in spite of the fact that great batches of the stuff are confiscated in the Gold Coast next door, and that Nigeria has obviously been singled out as the focus of the Communist propaganda drive against West Africa. After decades of neglect, the East as well as the West has begun to take another look at the Dark Continent.

The Cominform turned on full steam a couple of years ago with bales of reprints of the words of Stalin and Vishinsky et al., which were mailed free to interested individuals in the country. Some of this material came from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and the *Times* of London even reported that a little was being sent in from the United States. But the great bulk of such output was and is printed by the press of *Soviet News* in Rosary Gardens, London, a Russian Embassy outfit enjoying diplomatic status. Lately, the volume of propaganda has slackened. Nigerian press reaction has been largely hostile, the Communists don't seem to have made many converts, and the Government's policy of letting people make up their own minds seems to be paying off.

African students at various schools and universities in London are often mentioned as danger points. Oxford and Cambridge have had Africans for generations, but London landladies are rather new to African experience. In this strange and chilly new world of London, the Comrades make a great fuss over the Africans. African students who flunk, run out of money, can't make the grade one way or another (a high percentage suffer nervous breakdowns), or are rebuffed are offered the chance to go to Soviet Europe on handsome scholarships and become heroes. There are at least twenty Nigerian students now studying in eastern Europe, and nineteen of them were on exhibition at the Berlin Youth Rally last summer. Some of them probably went along for the ride, but they will be thoroughly indoctrinated when they return home at the end of their five- to seven-year course.

The few Communists who are now in Nigeria can reasonably be divided into two groups: the nationalist Communists, who are expected to become more nationalist and less Communist as time goes on; and "pure" Communists, who so far have been very quiet. The nationalist demagogue is much more likely to be indicted for sedition these days than the Communist Party card carrier.

The Governor reviews troops

The known Communists in Nigeria are mainly professional people—doctors, educators, lawyers, politicians, and labor leaders. Most of them have remained unmoved by the propaganda barrage. But some of the security people think that all this has been just the preparatory phase—that the tempo may well be stepped up in the next couple of years, and that the Communists will make a determined effort to capture the sphere of education, and with it the incalculable prestige that learning carries on this continent. If that happens, Nigeria may have to reconsider its policy.

Nation-to-Be

Whatever happens, Nigeria will be running itself completely within a short time. There are many hopeful signs. The thirst for education, for self-improvement of all sorts, is exciting to see and a little humbling. When the technical institute at Yaba advertised forty vacancies in carpentry and cabinetmaking, there were 1,100 applicants. There is a mass literacy campaign, under which people are learning to read and write in three to four months. Most progress of all is being made in adult education, particularly in housekeeping courses for women, which in time should push up the whole standard of living.

There are new textile industries, and agricultural experiments are beginning to yield handsome results (e.g., the discovery that food crops planted under oil palms during their early years improve the palm trees' crop over a long period). Government reading rooms are well patronized, and books are more popular than newspapers. New buildings for the University College at Ibadan are going up—bright-colored pavilion architecture reminiscent of the Festival of Britain, which is surprisingly well adapted to the tropics—and the six hundred students there take courses whose standards would be considered high at most good universities in either the United States or Britain.

The British hope that if they leave West Africa before they are thrown out, these colonies will stay in the Commonwealth, as India, Pakistan, and Ceylon have. As one observer said to us: "It all depends how the British get out. If they do it in the spirit of the new constitution, the Nigerians will remain their friends."

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Japan: New Guns For an Old Enemy

HESSELL TILTMAN

Tokyo

On May 3—Japan's "Independence Day" and the fifth anniversary of the new Constitution under which that nation renounced war and armaments—an "honor guard" of five hundred carbine-carrying, khaki-clad men of Japan's National Police Reserve flanked the platform on Tokyo's Imperial Palace Plaza from which the Emperor and Empress led the gathered thousands in celebrating the regaining of national sovereignty. Japan's army-like "internal security force" was publicly on show for the first time.

Today all Japanese political leaders regard rearmament as the biggest single issue confronting the nation. Moderate rightist opinion is typified by the views of ex-Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, who was Japanese Ambassador to the United States at the time of Pearl Harbor. "Japan alone," the Admiral told me, "is no match for the Russo-Chinese alliance. There must be a balance of power in the Far East to maintain peace. I believe the Japanese Constitution must be amended to permit limited rearmament to defend our own territory and territorial waters, but the Japanese people as a whole are not yet ready for the task. Whether Japan is legally obligated to rearm is not important; we must do our part."

The Socialists, like the Communists, are strongly opposed to any rearmament. Misaburo Suzuki, leader of Japan's left-wing Socialists, said recently: "The government of this country should know that it is not possible for Japan to have either real freedom or independence. And we must know that should a nation without independence, or a race without freedom, decide to institute an army, it has no choice but to become the hireling of foreign powers."

The left-wing Socialists have been urging the youth of Japan to refuse to join the National Police Reserve. Japan's financial experts are virtually unanimous in agreeing that the country cannot afford to rearm—yet. And an influential group of former army staff officers opposes the revival of military forces while the nation is under pressure from the United States.

Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida is publicly on record as being against rearmament—at least until Japan can do a thorough job of it. A majority of the Japanese people are still nominally against it also, but the number prepared to accept it purely for purposes of self-defense has, according to recent public-opinion polls, been rising.

It has been a good democratic debate, but the result is a foregone conclusion: Japan is going to rearm. The only real questions are "When?" "How much?" and "Who'll pay?"

One factor that makes Japanese rearmament certain is national pride and the desire, which was already in



evidence within a few days after the peace treaty went into effect, that a sovereign Japan should not rely indefinitely on others for its security. Another factor is the widespread fear that in any international emergency the American forces in Japan might be withdrawn, leaving a western-oriented Japan defenseless. The basic belief underlying the six-month-long debate is that the U.S. troops at present guarding the Japanese homeland should eventually be replaced by Japanese and that the United States, which took the lead in disarming Japan as thoroughly as any nation ever has been disarmed, must take the lead in assisting to rearm it.

The Army Speaks Up

Japan's former army officers, who in this century became a privileged caste that considered the welfare of the Japanese state to be in its special keeping, are split on the question of whether rearmament should come all at once or later. The chauvinistic upper crust of the prewar army has been "depurged," along with practically everyone else, but has almost no chance of staging a comeback under present conditions. Today the army "moderates" exert the only real influence wielded by former militarists. Most of them preach the necessity of eventual rearmament but decline to approve that step until a fully independent Japanese Army, under its own Minister and general staff and free from foreign influence, becomes politically feasible. An ambitious minority among this group would be prepared to tolerate a "mercenary" force under U.S. direction as a means of recovering lost rank and prestige, but the trend of public opinion is against this step.

No single leader can be said to represent these moderates as a whole, but three ex-officers have been prominent in shaping army opinion. The first is former Lieutenant General Eiichi Tatsumi, who was military attaché in Britain when Yoshida was Japanese Ambassador to the Court of St. James's. The second, a former senior aide to General Hideki Tojo named Takushiro

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Hattori who, after Japan's surrender, worked in Major General Charles A. Willoughby's intelligence section of GHQ. The third is former Colonel Masanobu Tsuji, known in prewar Japan as "the god of strategy," who planned and directed on the spot the most important land operations from Guadalcanal to Burma.

Ex-General Tatsumi is important at the moment mainly because he is reportedly the only military man who has Prime Minister Yoshida's ear in the matter of rearmament. Yoshida, having been briefly placed under "house arrest" during the war after a quarrel with Tojo, is allergic to militarists.

The "Hattori Plan," which has the backing of a number of influential former army officers, would compromise with democracy on only one point: The War Minister, in the future, *could* be a civilian instead of the uniformed nominee of the Imperial General Staff. Otherwise, the Hattori group demands that the new Japanese Army shall conform to the pattern of the old. According to members of the Hattori clique, the only big mistake the army made in prewar days was to permit the armed forces to become catspaws of the Black Dragon and other ultranationalistic outfits which sparked Japan's aggressions and made political assassination a thriving industry in the capital.

Ex-Colonel Tsuji, a bespectacled militarist who is widely regarded as a leftover fanatic, is known chiefly for his view, expressed last year, that Soviet Russia would emerge victorious in any third world war.

Prevailing opinion among less dogmatic former officers is that the reorganization of national defense, to fulfill its objective, must be free from any external pressures whatever. As this is impracticable at present, many army men favor delay until "true independence" has been achieved — by which they mean a situation in which it would no longer be obligatory that any enemy of the United States should, *ipso facto,* be the enemy of Japan.

Arma Virumque . . .

The seeming contradiction between demands for "true independence" and for continued U.S. aid is explained away by the argument that the United States has a moral obligation to assist Japan to rearm as well as a political obligation to make it a secure partner

of the western bloc. The best means of discharging these obligations without infringing Japan's sovereignty was indicated by a former Japanese staff officer, who told me, "The only way to make Japan really secure at this time would be for the Americans to evacuate the country, leaving behind their arms and equipment."

Aside from this one, the opinions as to the arms and establishment needed to make Japan "secure" vary widely.

The Hattori group wants an army of seventeen to twenty divisions, which could be expanded in the event of war to fifty divisions. A group calling itself the Japan Defense Research Association has advocated an army of 250,000 men, an air force of 2,100 planes and 35,000 men, and a navy totaling 280,000 tons and 40,000 men.

Modest Admirals

Japanese naval opinion is more moderate, being based upon the supposition that the tasks of future armed forces would be limited to the defense of the Japanese islands against amphibious attack, anti-submarine warfare, and aerial reconnaissance over Japanese waters. These duties, former naval officers estimate, would require an army totalling 180,000 men at full strength, a navy of about 80,000 to 85,000 men and ships totaling 100,000 tons, and from 1,000 to 1,200 planes—all short-range defensive fighters and reconnaissance craft to avoid arousing international suspicions. Such a well-rounded force, Japanese naval men estimate, would take about four years and would make Japan fully capable of defending itself while U.S. forces were being deployed during a future war.

United States military men in Tokyo have meanwhile been at work on plans calling for an army of ten divisions, plus supporting units, which would bring its total strength to around 250,000 men, an air force of 2,000 planes, and a navy of 200,000 tons—the entire program requiring about ten years.

Who'll Pay?

The cost of a modest measure of rearmament has been estimated at $1 billion for the first five years. The United States has so far donated $50 million toward arming the National Police Reserve, and so the "U.S. Military Aid Program for Japan" has already begun. Having earmarked 182 billion yen, or twenty-one per cent of the national budget, to defense appropriations this year, the Japanese government feels the nation cannot afford more right now. The attitude in Tokyo is still "We'll supply the men and the undershirts—you supply the rest."

The main effect to date of the activities of former army people has been an upsurge of apprehension among thoughtful Japanese that the militarists will regain their former position. Government circles have sought to quell such fears by declaring that the 75,000-man National Police Reserve (shortly to be increased to 110,000 men) "could stop any revival of militarism overnight." The people of Japan remain for the most part unconvinced, inclining mostly to the attitude that "The generals got us into trouble before. If we have an army, we shall have to have generals again. So, no army, please." The only hope, as they see it, lies in civilian control of the armed forces, such as exists in the United States and Britain. The "Hattori Plan" takes this feeling into account, but at present it is impossible to be sure that civilians would prove able to hold the neo-Tojos of tomorrow in check.

Japanese official circles are aware that any move now to repeal the Constitutional ban on armed forces would serve to increase still-existing uneasiness in India, the Philippines, China, and elsewhere concerning Japan's future intentions, and they also know that the result of the national referendum that would be necessary to revise the Constitution would, in the present mood of the nation, be doubtful. Furthermore, many members of the Yoshida Government distrust the former militarists as much as the voters do.

Actually, the rearmament of Japan started two weeks after Korean hostilities began, when Prime Minister Yo-

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shida received a letter from General MacArthur authorizing the Japanese government "to take the necessary measures to establish a National Police Reserve of 75,000 men."

The force thus organized to fill the vacuum created by the departure of United States occupation divisions to Korea has now completed its training. It wears uniforms almost indistinguishable from American ones and is organized on regular army lines. Its weapons include machine guns, bazookas, mortars, and small arms—and it will shortly receive artillery, and maybe tanks.

Danger in the Cradle

The events in Tokyo and other Japanese cities last May Day showed that the means of maintaining internal law and order must be at hand—but the widespread fear of a revival of militarism remains. The Prime Minister insists that the reserve is a police force. But anyone who has visited an N.P.R. camp and heard officers barking out orders will pardon the doubt expressed by *Mainichi* recently when it reminded readers that the real danger is not rearmament but that the National Police Reserve may serve as the cradle of a newborn nationalism, "which in Japan is so often identified with fascism and militarism."

The government has now announced its intention of officially transforming the Police Reserve into a "Defense Corps" on its second birthday next October. Takeo Ohashi, State Minister in charge of N.P.R. affairs, informed the Diet that "measures to increase the effectiveness of the force" would shortly be put into effect. Later he denied reports that the government was intending to introduce conscription to keep the corps at full strength. But Mr. Ohashi admitted the Cabinet was studying ways and means by which former N.P.R. men, after completion of their initial two-year term of service, could be recalled for emergency duty without amendment of Article 22 of the Constitution, which guarantees freedom to choose one's occupation. Under the proposed plan, said Mr. Ohashi, ex-N.P.R. men would not have to respond to such a call unless willing to do so. Thus an army and an army reserve may be created under a Constitution forbidding both.

Remarking that "self-defense is the sovereign right of an independent nation . . . there is no reason why the government should not take off the lid and tell the people what is cooking," the English-language Tokyo daily *Nippon Times* recently declared: "The point is that we must defend ourselves; we cannot indefinitely expect to get a free ride on the American pledge to preserve our independence and freedom from external aggression. . . . Prime Minister Yoshida and his government continue to exhibit a certain coyness on the whole question of rearmament. Officialdom continues to refer to the new armed forces in process of creation as a 'National Police Reserve,' 'Defense Corps,' 'Peace Preservation Corps,' or anything except an army—and an army which, in the opinion of many foreign observers, will within a short time be the finest military force, man for man, that exists in the Far East. . . ."

There are several reasons for this disinclination to admit the facts. Prime Minister Yoshida's temperament includes a normal ration of political cunning, and he probably does not wish, by agreeing openly to rearmament at this stage, to lose a bargaining point in any negotiations with the United States that may come later.

As for those most immediately concerned, the potential Japanese soldiers, their future officers are principally worried about the need for more thorough "democratic" education in the sacred duty of every citizen to defend the homes and shrines of his native land.

The process of "re-creating the national spirit" began last October when Prime Minister Yoshida, in a sharp reversal of his previous policy of "blaming everything on the army," made an official visit to Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine, which is dedicated to the souls of those who died in battle. In this year's budget the government appropriated funds for the relief of veterans and war widows. And on May 2 of this year Japan enshrined its Second World War dead at a solemn All-Japan War Memorial service in Tokyo which was attended by the Emperor and Empress, and at which silent prayers were offered by the greatest in the land for the souls of the 2.5 million who had died in Japan's wars since 1937.

'Hon. Captain . . .'

So the task of re-creating the Japanese Army proceeds, and more and more former officers await the day when they will awaken in barracks to hear a corporal announcing, in a voice audible three blocks away: "Honorable Captain, I have brought your breakfast." And when one asks former Japanese soldiers whether they would serve again, the usual fatalistic reply is, "If my Emperor so orders."

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A Short Circuit in the French Party Line

JEAN-JACQUES SERVAN SCHREIBER

PARIS

ON INSTRUCTIONS from Moscow, the leaders of the French Communist Party had ordered the people of Paris to come out into the streets to protest the arrival in the capital of the "Microbe General"—known to non-Communists as Matthew Ridgway. The Reds had prepared for the demonstrations with weeks of propaganda. But the masses refused to demonstrate. So that it could show its Soviet masters some tangible result, the party sent specially trained and subsidized shock troops against the police. At that point, its secretary-general, Jacques Duclos, was arrested for "plotting against the security of the state."

With Duclos jailed, the Communists called for a general protest strike and then for localized strikes—in the automobile industry, on the railroads. They threatened and exhorted their followers—to no effect. In Paris, the major Communist stronghold, life went on as usual on the day of the general strike. Public services—transportation, water, electricity, and street cleaning—functioned normally. The capital and the nation realized with surprise that the French Communist Party's hold over its ranks had become much weaker than at any moment since the war.

Too Many Generals

The apathy shown by the masses and even by militant party members has thrown the party leadership into serious confusion. With Duclos in jail and Maurice Thorez in Moscow—that is, with no undisputed boss to decide what to do—the French Communists have seen their plight worsened by contradictory instructions. In a first stage, François Billoux, back from Russia after conferring with Thorez, brought home instructions to "get tough," to put an end to collaboration with non-Communist trade unions and non-Communists in general, to throw out the intellectuals and the timid, and to reactivate the class struggle.

In short order, however, Etienne Fajon, of equal standing as a party doctrinaire, published in *L'Humanité* a report to the Central Committee in which he blamed the Ridgway-Duclos fiasco on "opportunism and sectarianism." The party, Fajon insisted, instead of getting tough, must appeal to all wage earners by fighting for their economic needs and must also woo even the middle classes and the farmers. The party must not be so doctrinaire and exclusive; it should seek support wherever support can be obtained. Moderation should be the keynote, he said, in word and action. When, for instance, the non-Communist paper *Le Monde* opposed Atlantic defense policies, full advantage should have been taken of the situation, and Pierre Courtade, *L'Humanité's* diplomatic editor, should not have reacted to such a windfall by calling *Le Monde* bourgeois. In brief, Fajon and Billoux did not see eye to eye. Their differences, at this writing, remain unresolved.

This confused situation cannot last long. The French government can, by clumsy tactical mistakes, gradually permit the Red general staff to regain control of its troops; or, by proper timing and political intelligence, it can so act that it may succeed completely in winning the French working classes away from the domination of Stalin's local representatives.

When it is realized that the French Communist Party is the second largest in western Europe, that it represents nearly five million voters, is a permanent threat to French democracy, and can therefore be considered responsible for the most serious internal weakness in the Atlantic alliance, the importance of the problem faced now by the French Government is understandable. One error in conception or execution could be disastrous.

A Poll of the Reds

A searching and detailed survey recently made by the French Institute of Public Opinion contributes greatly to understanding the French Communist voter, and goes far to explain the latest failures and successes of the French Communist Party.

The most important fact revealed is that the political beliefs of the average French Communist voter—roughly one Frenchman out of every four—are for the most part entirely unrelated, not to say entirely contradictory, to the party's official doctrine as well as to the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism. For instance:

Only nine per cent of the Communist voters believe that the party is hostile to parliamentary institutions, and only forty per cent believe that it should seize power by unconstitutional methods.

Only twenty-two per cent of the Communists believe that in the event of war between the Soviet Union and the United States, France should intervene in favor of the Soviets.

Only sixteen per cent believe that the Socialist Party is their enemy—this despite the fact that official Communist doctrine teaches that the worst enemy of the working classes is the social democrats.

Fewer than twenty-five per cent believe that their party's activity is governed by the world objectives of Soviet foreign policy.

Obviously, results of this kind of poll

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must be accepted and interpreted with great caution. But government circles are taking this particular survey very seriously. Roughly, it seems to indicate that French Communists are ideologically almost the precise equivalent of the British Bevanites. To the extent that the parallel is a real one, its importance becomes apparent, for it demonstrates how far from reality is the myth that has been built up around western European Communism.

Purge of a Nationalist

Moreover, the fuddled mentality of the Communist voter—so unlike what Moscow would wish it to be—is reflected within the party's leadership. Even before the recent open conflict between Fajon and Billoux, there were purges in the higher echelons of the party. It is always quite difficult to get trustworthy information as to what goes on at this exalted level, since the men concerned usually keep their difficulties secret. Yet in two or three important cases lately precise information has become known.

The most spectacular case is that of Georges Guingouin. Guingouin is forty-eight; he has been a member of the Communist Party for nearly thirty years. Before the war he was a schoolteacher in the Limoges region and took part in all party activities with energy and determination. He advanced rapidly in the party. After 1940, Guingouin organized Resistance units against the Germans, and his underground operations became famous throughout the country. In those days he opposed the tendencies in the French Politburo that were encouraged by André Marty, the most Stalinist of all French Communist leaders. In comparison with Marty, Maurice Thorez looks almost like a French patriot. On several occasions Guingouin refused to obey Marty's orders, considering them contrary to the interests of the Resistance movement and dictated by the Stalinist political line. With the years Guingouin's popularity increased. Paris leaders who opposed him never dared do so openly. He became mayor of Limoges, one of the most important Communist centers.

When the instructions from Moscow outlining the new "get tough" party line reached Paris this spring, two representatives of the Marty faction were sent down from Paris to Limoges to bring Guingouin to trial. They were Waldeck Roshet and Marcel Paul, both former Cabinet Ministers, both prominent in French Communism. They called a meeting of the local party committee. Guingouin had prepared a defense speech, but a strong-arm squad prevented him from speaking. He walked out of the hall. Two days later he resigned all the positions he held in the Communist Party and fled.

The Guingouin case is not an isolated one; other Communist leaders have been liquidated within recent weeks for "nationalist" tendencies—Dupuy (of the railroad unions), Gorbeaux (posts and telephones), Costes (of the powerful steelworkers' union), Lallemand (of the miners).

Rubicon at Renault

However serious the crisis may be in Communist leadership, it is still a fact that the largest trade-union organization in the country is still Communist-dominated. The CGT (Confédération Générale du Travail) represents sixty per cent of organized labor, but it has been losing ground steadily throughout the last five years. The reason is clear: It has become increasingly political. Five years ago, in 1947, when the CGT called for strikes throughout the nation, the strikes were seventy per cent effective. This spring, when the CGT called for a walkout to greet General Ridgway, and afterward to protest Duclos' arrest, ninety-three per cent of the workers stayed on the job.

Although three-quarters of the workmen at the big Renault plant in the Paris suburbs are CGT members, work started regularly on the morning of the Duclos strike. Soon Communist strong-arm squads arrived and proceeded immediately to strategic points. There was fighting, and by noon the Communists had succeeded in cutting off the power. Work came to a halt, and management was astute enough not to interfere. The next morning leaders of the non-Communist minority unions in the factory, Socialists, Catholics, and Independents, met and decided to throw out the goon squads. A few hours later the job was done—with the help of the CGT workmen. Next day there was no trouble.



What happened at Renault and in other factories throughout France inspired the leaders of the non-Communist unions to create a trade-union "common front" which they hope will be joined by CGT members tired of being led about by the Stalinists. Theoretically the plan has possibilities; in practice it will be difficult to work out. For between the two principal non-Communist trade unions, Socialist and Catholic, there is still the religious problem. The ancient controversy about the "lay state" has always separated the two movements; it still makes collaboration difficult.

To complicate matters, the third group of non-Communist unions, the Independents, represents in general a more specialized type of worker whose interests in social reform and wages differ from those of unions representing the working masses. For these reasons it seems unlikely that a non-Communist common-front coalition could act with any real unity, except to defend its membership from Stalinist coercion. But in this limited and all-important aim it can be effective.

Repression vs. Tactics

The arguments for and against outlawing the French Communist Party have been presented again and again. There is, of course, a certain paradox in the spectacle of a country preparing military defense against the Soviet threat and permitting a powerful fifth column to serve Soviet interests openly throughout the nation and even in its parliament. And it is generally agreed that the French Communist Party could be outlawed. But here a general principle applies: No governmental action in this field or in any other can be effective unless supported by public opinion. At present French public opinion is against violence. The Communists want the government to be blamed for such outbreaks; they try to provoke the government into repression by force; that is why they send their trained squads to riot in the streets. The Pinay Administration is unwilling to play into their hands.

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There is nothing new in the Communist tactics. In 1948, when the Marshall Plan was proving its immense worth to France's economy, the Communists tried to distract public attention from that success by sabotaging coal production. They called a strike in the coal mines, expecting that the government would use force and use it clumsily. They counted on benefiting politically from the Administration's repressive action, but the Communists were not the only ones who had read Lenin. French officials had read him too, and they knew his formula of the three stages: A strike called for economic reasons can be made political and then revolutionary.

As long as the St.-Etienne coal strike remained an economic strike, for wages and working conditions, with mass support behind it, the government refused to intervene. The Administration kept its head. The strike had started with the normal objective of stopping production, and the miners, Communist and non-Communist alike, were solidly behind it. But then the strikers found that the Communist leaders were trying to destroy the pits, and they did not want their means of livelihood destroyed. It was then that police went into action—when the strike had obviously entered its politico-revolutionary phase. The government's job had not been made easy, but it had been made possible, for now public opinion was in its favor. The Communist leaders had been isolated.

Workingmen Will Decide

In a fundamentally democratic and anti-fascist nation such as France, public opinion ultimately settles the fate of any movement. And by public opinion I do not mean that of the political Right or Center; the masses of French workingmen will make the decision on Communism that counts.

It is too soon to make any prediction as to how the five million who have been voting Communist will vote in the next elections. But for the first time since 1945 there are sound reasons for hoping that the Communist enclave in France may be abolished. Much of course depends on how wisely members of the government and of the labor movement act. But today the outcome depends on Frenchmen, and on French workingmen in particular, rather than on Stalin. There is reason for hope.

Senator Bricker Finds a Loophole

LINDSAY ROGERS

Does the Constitution of the United States contain a major loophole that has remained undiscovered for more than a century and a half? Could the President and two-thirds of the members of the Senate, by virtue of their power to make treaties with foreign nations, "revolutionize the relationship between the American people and their government as prescribed by the Constitution"? Does the President's power to make executive agreements with other governments represent a serious threat to our own fundamental liberties?

Fifty-eight members of the Senate have gone on record as believing that these questions may require affirmative answers. They have joined with Senator John W. Bricker of Ohio in requesting discussion of a Constitutional amendment that Bricker proposes as a plug for the supposed loophole.

The strong support given the Bricker proposal reveals not only the usual Senatorial distrust of the executive branch of the government but a new Senatorial hostility to the United Nations. When a subcommittee of Senator Pat McCarran's Committee on the Judiciary was holding hearings on the Bricker resolution and an opponent of the resolution suggested that the Senate could certainly be depended upon to reject any treaty that might "revolutionize the relationship between the American people and their government," Senator McCarran burst out: "I am not so sure of that. I voted for the United Nations and I will regret it as long as I live."

Since Washington's Administration, Presidents have used executive agreements. Sometimes these have irritated Senatorial *amour-propre,* but most have been accepted. Nowadays the vast majority of executive agreements are entered into only after legislative authorization. They relate to mutual defense, assistance under the Point Four program, reciprocal tariff concessions, air routes for commercial lines, and so on. The alarmed Senators have not cited any such commitments that they think should have been avoided. They have merely referred vaguely to the Cairo, Teheran, and Yalta agreements, which were primarily military in character.

Senator Bricker's amendment would make the Constitution say, "Executive agreements shall not be made in lieu of treaties." This would call into question the validity of every future executive agreement. As trivial a matter as an exchange of official publications could be the subject of a full-dress treaty debate if the Senate so chose.

The proposed amendment also provides that executive agreements, if not terminated sooner, shall expire automatically one year after the end of the term of office for which the President making the agreement shall have been elected. Such a limitation would gravely handicap a President in dealing with foreign powers, whose representatives would be able to say: "Your promises have a time limit unless that uncertain quantity, Congress, is willing to act." Moreover, the possibility of nonrenewal would presumably give other governments the option of refusing to renew.

Too Many Dogcatchers

The other matter that alarms Senator Bricker and his supporters is the so-called "supremacy clause" of the Constitution: "all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything

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in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding."

This would seem to be elemental. How could the government of the United States be a "high contracting party" if the treaties it entered into could be lived up to only when every state, county, and local authority down to the dogcatcher of East Podunk was willing to go along? Treaties give our citizens certain rights in foreign countries, whose citizens must manifestly have reciprocal rights throughout the whole of the United States. In order that American banks can establish branches in France, a branch of a French bank in California must not be left to the mercy of capricious action by the legislature in Sacramento. If the "supremacy clause" had not been insisted upon, Madison wrote in *The Federalist,* "the world would have seen for the first time a system of government founded on an inversion of the fundamental principles of any government; it would have seen the authority of the whole society everywhere subordinate to the authority of the parts: it would have seen a monster, in which the head was under the direction of the members."

Instead, the parts were subordinated to the whole. And until now there has been only one serious controversy because the obligations of a treaty irked state and local authorities. During Theodore Roosevelt's Administration, the San Francisco Board of Education provided for the segregation of Japanese children in the public schools. Japan protested on the ground that the "rights of residence" promised Japanese citizens in a treaty between the United States and Japan included educational privileges. With the approval of Secretary of State Elihu Root, a test case was prepared in such a way that it could go promptly to the Supreme Court of the United States; but this proved to be unnecessary. Roosevelt got the school board and San Francisco's mayor to come to Washington and agree to a compromise: All alien pupils would attend the regular schools if they knew English and were within the age limits of the various grades; children not meeting these requirements would be segregated. Thus there would be no discrimination against Japanese children. Public opinion in the Pacific states has at times been belligerent toward the Japanese, but not many residents of the area have ever been heard to maintain that treaties should cease to be the supreme law of the land.



Wide World

Senator John W. Bricker

A treaty with Japan, however, is one thing and a multilateral treaty such as the Charter of the United Nations is another. Ironically, it was a court case in California that first brought to Senator Bricker's attention his Constitutional loophole. In 1950 a California state court held that a California law restricting the ownership of land by aliens could not be enforced because the United Nations Charter barred such discrimination.

The Preamble to the Charter enunciates some high aims for the peoples of the United Nations. They announce their determination "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights" and "in the equal rights of men and women" and "to practice tolerance and to live together in peace with one another as good neighbors." Article 55 of the Charter declares that the United Nations shall promote "Universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." For the achievement of these purposes "All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the organization . . ."

This language does no more than express pious hopes and promise action in the future. It was obvious even to Senator Bricker that the California decision was not good law, and since the introduction of his proposed amendment, it has been reversed on appeal. His principal alarm was over certain treaties being currently negotiated within the United Nations.

For several years, and with generous tolerance, representatives of the United States have been participating in attempts to elaborate an international bill of rights and to draft a convention on freedom of information. These aims are high, and it may well be that in such a field the reach should exceed the grasp. But the government has apparently been insufficiently aware of the difficulty of the task. How, on matters affecting human rights, can there be any possibility of agreement between the western world and the Soviet Union and its satellites, or Perón's Argentina, or Tito's Yugoslavia? The State Department might have remembered Dr. Johnson's opinion of a dog walking on its hind legs. "It is not done well," he said, "but you are surprised to find it done at all."

It has been attempted, and we have found that it cannot be done well. The resulting agreements amount to a lowest common denominator, well below the guarantees in the countries where liberty is cherished. Take the language on freedom of opinion:

"The right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas carries with it special duties and responsibilities and may therefore be subject to certain penalties, liabilities and restrictions, but these shall be such only as are provided by law and are necessary for the protection of national security, public order, safety, health or morals, or of the rights, freedoms or reputations of others."

Escape from Platitudes

And for all the rights that the covenant enumerates there is a general escape clause:

"In the case of a state of emergency officially proclaimed by the authorities or in the case of public disaster, a state may take measures derogating, to the extent strictly limited by the exigencies of the situation, from its obligation."

So many Senators have expressed adverse opinions on this covenant that, in its present form, it has no chance of approval. But suppose the Senate in

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an absent-minded moment did consent to ratification? What legal consequences would flow from the fact that the covenant would be the supreme law of the land? Senator Bricker fears that the Supreme Court would say that the covenant authorized restrictions on freedom of religion and of the press now barred by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Supreme Court has never had such a case before it, but certainly no Constitutional lawyer has ever challenged the proposition that a treaty, like a Congressional statute, would be invalid if it deprived citizens of liberties guaranteed by the Constitution.

Senatorial Self-Doubt

Senator Bricker's amendment goes on to provide that "No treaty or executive agreement shall vest in any international organization or in any foreign power any of the legislative, executive, or judicial powers vested by this Constitution in the Congress, the President, and in the courts of the United States, respectively."

No one now proposes such vesting, but who can be sure that some day it will not seem advisable? If Senator Bricker has his way, the Constitution would then have to be reamended to sanction what seemed wise.

But the most amazing of Bricker's proposals would in effect enlarge the loophole that he professes to see: "No treaty or executive agreement shall alter or abridge the laws of the United States or the Constitution or laws of the several states unless, and then only to the extent that, Congress shall so provide by act or joint resolution."

This would mean that Congress could by Act or joint resolution approve an executive agreement and alter the Constitution or laws of the several states. Bare majorities in both houses of Congress could make an executive agreement the supreme law of the land. Whether or not he so intended, Senator Bricker would take away from the states the protection that the requirement of a two-thirds Senate majority on treaties now gives them. Up to now, two-thirds of the Senate never has voted to approve treaties that were "unconstitutional" or encroached unduly on the powers of the states. Is it not sublimely ironical that the same Senators who so distrust the executive power and are trying to increase the powers of the Senate now also seem to distrust the two-thirds rule?

The great and genuine danger has always been the possibility of minority vetoes of treaties that the country desired and that were clearly in its interest. "A treaty," John Hay sadly remarked, "is like a bull going into the arena. No one can say just how or when the blow will fall—but one thing is certain—it will never leave the arena alive." Most treaties do leave the arena alive, but now certain Senators desire a Constitutional amendment that would make the death blow possible before the arena was reached. There is, however, one consolation. Those who think they see a Constitutional loophole will have difficulty in agreeing on the plug that is desirable. Many of them will conclude, as Charles Lamb did in a famous essay, that one can roast a pig without burning down the house that contains it. They may even come to believe that there is no pig ready for roasting. Then they may stop conjuring up Constitutional chimeras and devote their attention to the questions of the content and method of our foreign policy. This would help convince our allies (and many Americans) that in the conduct of foreign relations the U.S. Senate has achieved at least a little maturity.

The Southern Textile Industry: A Union Man's Nightmare

WILLIAM S. FAIRFIELD

Like the man who blames his ulcers on high taxes, organized labor has lately tended to hold the Taft-Hartley Act responsible for all its ills. Most of labor's friends in the press and in government have accepted the self-diagnosis without question. It was therefore no surprise this spring when a Senate subcommittee, generally conceded to be pro-labor in its inclinations, blamed the Taft-Hartley Act not only for the total failure of the postwar drive to unionize the Southern textile industry, but also for the fact that the drive had turned into something of a rout—a rout in the course of which CIO members under contract among the South's 600,000 textile workers has been whittled from 120,000 to about 90,000.

The subcommittee pointed out that sixty per cent of the U.S. textile industry, including manufacturers of woolens and synthetics as well as of cotton, has migrated from New England to the South during the past twenty-five years, so that four-fifths of the industry is now located below the Mason-Dixon Line, where textile labor costs average fifteen to twenty-one cents an hour lower.

With only one out of seven South-

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ern millworkers in the fold of the CIO's Textile Workers Union of America, and with only a few thousand additional Southern workers holding cards in the AFL's much smaller United Textile Workers, cloth manufacturing emerges as the last basic U.S. industry that operates primarily with unorganized labor and without collective bargaining for its workers. The subcommittee, deploring this situation in the nation's second largest industry, has suggested the normal Washington solution to all problems: corrective legislation—in this case, amending the Taft-Hartley Act.

What the subcommittee has neglected to mention, however, is that organization of the Southern textile workers had proved a substantial flop long before the Taft-Hartley Act was passed in 1947.

Forces Against Unionism

The real reason for the failure of the union movement in the Southern textile industry is not legislative. Nor is it, strictly speaking, geographic, as some have suggested, pointing to the southward migration of the industry. Sizable segments of the electrical and steel industries have also moved South in the past decade, but Southern steel and electrical workers, along with machinists, miners, and railroad workers, are as thoroughly organized today as their fellows in the North. Only the Southern textile industry remains overwhelmingly non-union.

There is an explanation of this phenomenon. When one travels through the textile belt of the South, following the Piedmont plateau from southern Virginia down through the middle of North and South Carolina and on into Georgia and Alabama, there takes shape a pattern of economic and sociological factors apparently peculiar to the Southern textile industry alone, and a pattern just as apparently unsuited to successful labor organization.

Practically every town has its own textile mill, and to this extent the common denominator "mill town" describes them all. The average town has perhaps four thousand people. The average mill employs perhaps six hundred. There are, of course, big names in the Southern textile industry, among them Cannon, Pacific, and Burlington. These large corporations, however, all operate through chains of small mills.

Whether the town's mill is home-owned or operated by a chain makes little difference. It is still generally the only source of mass employment open to the populace. Consequently, it exercises complete economic control over the community. With such economic power, domination of words and ideas readily follows. Local bankers and businessmen are happy to accept the economic and social philosophy of the firm to which they owe whatever prosperity they enjoy. The town's Chamber of Commerce and all other civic and fraternal groups automatically fall in line with the anti-union policies of the mill, as do the editorial policies of both the local newspaper and the local radio station.

The community's elected officials, from police chief to judge and mayor, are no more immune. Often these men have been employed by the mill in executive or legal capacities before running for office. Almost all of them can credit their election to campaign support from the mill management.

The mill is also unstinting in its financial support of the local churches. Partly because of this support, there is actually such a thing as a "textile preacher," I was informed by a Presbyterian minister in North Carolina, a man who freely admitted he might be classed as one himself. "My people are so irresponsible," he complained. "I've got to preach a good day's work for a good day's pay. . . . No, there isn't much time for social-justice sermons down here."

Thus the textile manufacturer is able to mobilize on his side every force in the community. He can mobilize the local grocer and banker, who can shut off a worker's credit; mobilize all the private and public agencies in the town, which might otherwise provide relief for strikers' families, as they do in the North; mobilize the newspaper and the radio station; mobilize the judge who issues injunctions against the union; mobilize the sheriff who enforces those injunctions; and even mobilize the preacher in his pulpit.

Scabs and Overseers

To buck such massed opposition, the mill hand in the Piedmont obviously must feel much stronger about his union than a worker in any of the industrial centers of the North. Unfortunately, on the average he seems to feel just the opposite.

In the first place, his small town, unlike the cities of the North, offers only one source of employment, the mill. Also, he knows that in the event of a strike, the mill could resume partial operation with a hundred-odd scabs, compared with the thousands of imported workers needed for skeleton operation of the huge factories common to other major industries. Finally, if his mill is part of a chain like Burlington, the mill hand realizes the corporation could shut down locally for an indefinite period and operate quite satisfactorily on its remaining forty-four cylinders.

Unlike the mountain folk who work the small-town mining industry of Kentucky and Tennessee, the textile worker is a product of the stratified social structure of the Old South. His superior in the mill is not known as a supervisor but by the old plantation term "overseer." Often the worker accepts the paternalism practiced by almost all Piedmont millowners at face value. "Look what Mr. Cannon has done for us!" was an expression I heard again and again. The obvious rebuttal,

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"Look what we've done for Mr. Cannon!" I heard only once—from an avid union man.

Also, about half the workers in the average mill are members of tenant-farming and sharecropping families, accustomed to the backbreaking, dawn-to-dusk task of eking a living out of the thin red soil of the Piedmont. To them, an eight-hour day with a pay check at the end of each week is not very far this side of paradise. According to William Billingsley, a CIO organizer from Greensboro, North Carolina, "Convincing the rural workers they'll get the higher wages that prevail in New England if they join the union is like convincing them that if they'll get on a rocket ship to the moon they'll eat green cheese three times a day."

Even so, the old standby quote of mill management, to the effect that "our workers don't want or need a union," is ridiculous. Fear that they will lose their only available source of livelihood is primarily what keeps the Southern mill workers in line, not devotion to the millowner or faith in his good intentions.

'How Are We Going to Live?'

On a recent payday in Carrboro, North Carolina, the local unorganized mill, part of the Pacific chain, handed out checks well below the amounts workers had expected. The mill management simply explained it had cut its piecework pay scale, without notice. The uproar that ensued forced the mill to send most of its workers home for the day. That night, however, union sentiment in Carrboro did not appear to be noticeably strengthened, perhaps because three workers who had talked union more than a year before had been fired.

A few days later, at Cannon's non-union mills in Kannapolis, North Carolina, piecework rates in the sewing room were similarly cut. Several of the women broke down and cried at their machines. The same evening, J. B. Talbert, one of the handful of Cannon workers who admit to CIO membership, told me of a woman who had just been laid off by Cannon after thirty-one years' service, without consideration of seniority and without retirement pay. The woman had told Talbert she prayed for the union to succeed. But when J. B. asked her son to sign a CIO pledge card in her presence, she pleaded against it. "How are we going to live?" she asked.

Joe Pedigo, a veteran CIO hand, later showed me a discharge slip a woman had received from an unorganized Georgia mill. There was no mention of inefficiency or lack of seniority. Instead, the reason for discharge, as typed on the slip in its entirety, read: "Because her husband won't work."

No Raises for Bad Boys

Back in the depression days of the 1930's, when unannounced pay slashes and indiscriminate firings were frequent events in every mill town, both the CIO and the AFL met a limited degree of success in their attempts to organize Southern textile workers. But from the time when the Second World War cut off German and Japanese textile markets, the U.S. textile industry has been expanding, with bigger and better payrolls in the offing. And even now, most Southern mills are operating two full shifts.

Prosperity is never helpful to union organizations. Of more direct significance to the situation in the Piedmont, however, are the valuable lessons learned by textile management in its losing battles against unionism in New England, lessons which have migrated South with the mills.

In 1948, Roanoke Mills instituted a maneuver that has since been widely copied. Its Mill No. 1 had been organized in March, with the CIO union certified as bargaining agent. On August 13, Roanoke's president wrote the workers at Mill No. 1, noting that all employees in his non-union mills would shortly get a raise in pay. No raises, he regretted, could be given to the organized employees at Mill No. 1 until successful negotiations with the union had been concluded. Negotiations were then effectively stalled until the following spring, when the workers at Roanoke No. 1, in an election forced by the company, voted out the union.

In September, 1950, the CIO's textile union got a ten per cent pay increase for its members in New England. Quickly it prepared to ask for a similar ten per cent in the South, and to call a general strike if its demands were not met. Before the union could even announce its Southern demands, however, Burlington Mills, which had been watching New England closely, granted an eight per cent wage increase. When most of the other big Southern textile companies followed suit, the union was placed in the position of causing a great deal of trouble over a pitiful two per cent. It canceled all its plans, with consequent loss of face.

To bitter union field organizers such as the CIO's Truman Henderson of Georgia, these industry tactics amount to "feeding just enough crumbs to the workers to keep the union out."

King Cannon

Paternalism in the Piedmont has probably reached its extreme at the Cannon Mills' home base of Kannapolis, a town of 28,000 in which Cannon's giant Plant 1 and smaller Plant 4 employ a total of about 13,000 textile workers.

The ruler of Kannapolis is Charles A. Cannon, president of the firm which bears his name and which produces half the towels in the United States. Cannon has been termed by *Forbes* magazine "as paternalistic as they come." In fact, he owns the entire downtown section of Kannapolis, as well as about two thousand of its homes. The average five-room clapboard bungalow rents to mill workers for about $20 a month.

At first glance, Kannapolis appears to be a normal American town, cleaner than most and more uniform in its colonial brick architecture. But then various small details become apparent.

Kannapolis has only one bank, and Charles A. Cannon is listed as a member of the board of directors. When the Security Bank and Trust Company of Salisbury decided to open a branch in Kannapolis, it found it could rent no space downtown. It has now erected perhaps the loneliest bank in the nation, in the corner of an open field some two miles from the heart of town.

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CIO headquarters, of course, is also located on the highway well outside Kannapolis. The name of the old secondary school is Cannon High. The community medical center is directed by Cannon official George Batt, and is known to natives as "Plant 13."

The newspaper is the Kannapolis *Independent*, a somewhat ironic name, since it is reportedly controlled by Charlie Cannon's son-in-law Robert Hayes, and since the paper admittedly rents its building from Cannon Mills. When the announced net profits of Cannon Mills jumped from $7 million in 1950 to $13 million in 1951, the *Independent* neglected to report such statistics. Instead, a short news item merely stated that 1951 profits per share of stock were below the last five years' average. The *Independent* also has an established written policy of refusing paid union advertisements.

The local radio station, WGTL, is owned by Fred H. Whitley, a friend of Charlie Cannon's who rents space for his funeral parlor and his insurance office from Cannon Mills. WGTL consistently refused to accept a paid fifteen-minute CIO program until the Federal Communications Commission stepped into the situation, whereupon Whitley still insisted on censoring all CIO scripts, deleting the word "Cannon" wherever it appeared.

All in the Family

Kannapolis is among the largest unincorporated communities in the United States. The reason for this is difficult to surmise. Certainly Cannon can hardly fear that the election of town officials that would follow incorporation would lead to local governmental policies counter to his own desires. The citizens of Kannapolis already vote for representatives to the North Carolina Legislature, the two present members being Dwight Quinn, a Cannon Mills foreman, and E. T. Bost, Jr., Cannon's first cousin. Possibly, however, an elected mayor of Kannapolis would offer Charles A. Cannon competition as the acknowledged leader of the community.

Most of the people of Kannapolis are evangelists by faith. By far the two largest churches are the First Baptist and the Church of God, each with a congregation of about five hundred. Cannon contributes heavily to both, and each pastor in return is convinced that unions aren't needed in Kannapolis. "Charles Cannon is a fine man, a really fine man," the Reverend Price H. McCarn of the Church of God told me, with as much conviction as if he were quoting Scripture.

One civic-minded citizen of Kannapolis describes his town as "a better example of benevolent despotism than of democracy." His remark tends to support the *Forbes* magazine statement that "Around Kannapolis, workers' private lives aren't their own: a man seen a little high in a local bar gets reported, may also get the axe." The latter remark is rather limited in its application, however, since Charlie Cannon permits no bars in *his* town.

Somehow, Cannon Mills has been able to combine this blatant paternalism with a lower-than-average pay scale and still avoid major labor disputes. The minimum wage at Cannon Mills is $1 an hour, compared with the $1.03½ to $1.10 an hour set by the South's other leading textile firms. Cannon also refuses to adopt the five-cent-an-hour third-shift premium generally provided in the Piedmont textile industry. In addition, the Cannon mill hand doesn't get a single national holiday off with pay and he must be satisfied with a one-week annual vacation no matter how long he has worked for the company.

In *Forbes's* latest annual survey of the nation's thirteen largest textile



companies, Cannon Mills is listed thirteenth in efficiency of management and is tied for ninth place in labor relations. Perhaps the CIO rated Cannon much the same when it set out to organize workers in Kannapolis more than a year ago. At any rate, four and sometimes five CIO organizers have been in the vicinity of Kannapolis daily since early 1951. The results are somewhat less than encouraging. To date, only two thousand Cannon workers have signed CIO pledge cards. This is about half of the thirty per cent needed to get National Labor Relations Board certification for a union election, and some 3,500 less than is needed to win such an election.

Mrs. McKnight's Autopsy

There are, of course, a few other factors that have also worked against the union movement in the Southern textile industry. The Taft-Hartley Act's free-speech clause, allowing management to engage in anti-union harangues to captive audiences of union workers, is one such factor. The inevitable CIO-AFL squabbles over the same textile bones is another.

More important than these factors have been the tortuous delays of from one to two years in NLRB handling of unfair-labor-practices cases. Mrs. Hazel McKnight of Carrboro, for example, was fired by the local Pacific mill in November, 1950, allegedly for union activity. The NLRB finally got around to hearing her case this January, one year and two months after her discharge. At last report, she had still not received the NLRB decision that might force her reinstatement at the mill. In the meantime, she estimates, the two-hundred or so Pacific workers she had persuaded to sign union cards have dwindled to about fifty. Many will agree with the CIO Textile Union president Emil Rieve that the NLRB "does not give decisions in these cases; it performs autopsies."

The Taft-Hartley Act, the inter- and intraunion fights, and even the NLRB delays, however, must all be rated as mere contributing factors to the failure of the union movement in the Piedmont. All CIO and AFL field organizers in the South seem to recognize that the real problem is the specialized economic and sociological structure of the Southern textile industry, a problem that cannot be solved solely by union harmony or by legislation.

"All in all, it gets pretty discouraging," says Joe Pedigo. "Sometimes I think the only way we'll ever organize these Southern mill workers is to convince them they'll go to hell if they don't join the union." With most of the preachers in the Piedmont spreading just the opposite message, Pedigo's solution will probably remain unworkable.

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The Cautious Return Of the Pollsters

SPENCER KLAW

AT LEAST one prediction can safely be made about this year's Presidential election: As a sporting contest, it will not be robbed of any of its suspense by the public-opinion polls. To be sure, the same pollsters who were so wrong in 1948 are back in business, or will be setting up shop soon. This time, however, there are not likely to be any pronouncements such as Elmo Roper's complacent disclosure, two months before the 1948 election, that "as of this September 9, my whole inclination is to predict the election of Thomas E. Dewey by a heavy margin and devote my time and effort to other things." On the contrary, a certain amount of hedging may be in order, as suggested by a recent release from George Gallup's organization containing the phrase "Survey evidence up to the present would indicate . . ."

Even if caution is discarded as the pollsters warm to their work, no one is likely to stay home on Election Day this year, as some Republicans may have done in 1948, because the polls indicate that the election is already in the bag. Nevertheless, the pollsters have heartening evidence that the public, no matter how skeptical it may be of the accuracy of opinion polls, still regards them as first-rate entertainment.

Gallup's releases, for instance, are appearing in 206 daily and Sunday newspapers, as compared with 226 just before the 1948 election. Roper, who swore off journalism when Truman was victorious, has backslid, and is again taking the pulse of the electorate. His weekly column is being printed by forty-three papers, twenty-five fewer than carried it in the summer of 1948. Archibald Crossley, who has always looked on pre-election polling as a necessary but rather tiresome adjunct to his market-research business, will start polling the country soon after the Conventions. This year, though, his surveys will not be distributed by King Features, the Hearst syndicate that handled them in the past. In Crossley's place, King Features has signed up a man named Kenneth Fink.

Fink, who is running his first national pre-election poll, seems immune to the virus of humility that has debilitated the prose style of his rivals. To cite just one example, a release sent out this spring by the New Jersey Poll, which Fink has been operating for five years, was headed: NEW JERSEY POLL RIGHT AGAIN—HOLDS PERFECT RECORD.

As Fink Goes, So Goes Jersey

The release neglected to mention that in 1948, the pollsters' only recent bad year, Fink was dealing only with the New Jersey electorate, and that Gallup and Crossley, as well as Fink, correctly predicted that Dewey would carry New Jersey. Fink, however, takes the position that any correct forecasts his rivals happen to make are largely a matter of luck, since they don't know how to interview properly. He has accused them of, among other things, interviewing in the wrong places. Fink's interviewers do all their interviewing on the street, on the theory that this is the only way to ensure strict anonymity. A person interviewed at home, he believes, may give untrue answers or refuse to answer at all, because he knows the interviewer can find out his name simply by looking on the mailbox.

Fink also maintains that his staff interviewers are more industrious, intelligent, and adroit than those his rivals employ. He spends a good deal of time with them in the field so that they can profit by his example. "I've interviewed more than a hundred thousand people myself, Bub," he told a recent visitor to

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his office in Princeton. "I'm the best goddam interviewer in the world."

Other pollsters feel that Fink has something of an obsession about interviewing. A committee of the Social Science Research Council conducted a careful examination of the 1948 polls and then reported: "We found many *possibilities* of errors due to the interviewing but very little evidence on their magnitude and direction." The committee felt there were other errors more directly responsible for the failure of the polls, and Fink's rivals seem to be concentrating on correcting these mistakes rather than on overhauling their methods of training and supervising interviewers.

To begin with, this year all pollsters are planning to poll right up to Election Day. They failed to do this in 1948, and consequently missed the strong drift to Truman that set in late in the campaign. They will also press harder to determine the true leanings of undecided voters. Last time, the three national polling organizations either ignored undecided interviewees, on the theory that most of them wouldn't vote anyway, or else assumed that a majority of them, like the majority of other persons interviewed, would vote for Dewey. This turned out to be a serious mistake. Studies made after the election indicated that many of the undecided did go to the polls, and that two-

thirds of them voted for Truman. In addition, the pollsters have devised special questions intended to eliminate potential nonvoters from their samples.

Statistical Hanky-Panky

Gallup has already tried out some of these new techniques in a poll he took just before the 1950 Congressional election, and the results were most gratifying to the Old Master. He predicted that the Republican candidates would get forty-nine per cent of the vote, and the Democratic candidates fifty-one per cent. The Republicans actually got 49.7 per cent, and the Democrats 50.3.

Reassured by this prediction, the most accurate he had ever made, Gallup last fall wrote for *Cosmopolitan* an article called "We Won't Be Red-Faced This Time!" While the text was rather more cautious in tone than the title would indicate, Gallup did at one point revert to some of the statistical hanky-panky that beguiled a good many of his readers in 1948.

After stating that "Accuracy within 3 or 4 per cent would be well within the range of good performance" in a pre-election poll, he wrote: "Actually, the 1948 error was inside this range, even though we failed to pick the winner. Our error on the Truman forecast was 5.3 percentage points, on Dewey 4.1, on Wallace 1.6, and on Thurmond 0.4. The average for the four was 2.9."

There is, of course, another way to figure it. For example, Gallup predicted that Wallace would get four per cent of the vote. He actually got only 2.4 per cent. In other words, Gallup forecast that Wallace would get more than half again the number of votes he actually polled—to be exact, sixty-six per cent more. By the same reckoning, Gallup overestimated the Dewey vote by nine per cent, and underestimated the Thurmond and Truman vote by 16.6 and 10.6 per cent respectively. Averaging these percentages, his overall error was 25.6 per cent, which isn't so hot. This doesn't prove much except that there's more than one way to keep a box score on predictions. But so far, no scoring method has been devised to show that in 1948 the pollsters picked Truman to win.

The Wisdom of Learned Hand

GOUVERNEUR PAULDING

THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND. Collected, with an Introduction and Notes, by Irving Dilliard. *Alfred A. Knopf. $3.50.*

THIS IS NOT a tribute to Judge Hand. The tributes have been paid him by his peers. He is eighty now. For more than forty years on the Federal bench he wrote opinions which, interpreting and illuminating the law, carried on the highest tradition of our jurisprudence. But that is the sort of thing for his fellow judges to say, or for President Truman, well counseled, who wrote to Judge Hand May 23, 1951, on his retirement from active service: ". . . . Your profession has long since recognized the magnitude of your contribution to the law. There has never been any question about your pre-eminent place among American jurists—indeed among the nations of the world. In your writings, in your day to day work for almost half a century, you have added purpose and hope to man's quest for justice through the process of law."

It may be, too, that Learned Hand has had tributes paid him from another source, although such tributes rarely

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find expression: The litigants who appeared before him, those who lost their cases as well as those who won, surely would pay him the supreme, if unspoken, tribute of knowing that they had faced a judge who cared only for truth.

He has permitted Irving Dilliard to gather his papers and addresses—thirty-four brief pieces—into a book. The first of these papers is Learned Hand's Class Day oration at Harvard in 1893; the last, entitled "At Fourscore," is an address pronounced this year at the Harvard Club in New York. In the first there are these lines: "Forty years hence . . . can we look back to some work done that will need no undoing?" In the last he gives the postulates for a life's work that will "need no undoing." "On what have we staked our hopes? Is it less than the thesis, as yet quite unverified, that the path towards the Good Life is to assure unimpeded utterance to every opinion, to be fearful of all orthodoxies and to face the discords of the Tower of Babel; all with the hope that in the end the dross will somehow be automatically strained out, and we shall be left with the golden nuggets of truth? That, I submit, is a faith that you cannot teach by precept; it has never carried, and will never carry, its credentials on its face; we can learn it only by experience, only by the elimination of other faiths which have proved themselves false; long trial and infinite patience are required for that."

Judge Learned Hand

'The Sense of Mutability'

There is grave danger that this patience today is lacking. "The slogans we live by: 'Democracy,' . . . 'the Bill of Rights,' 'the Constitution'—the whole paraphernalia of our eighteenth-century inheritance—all must now make good their claims against the furious repudiation of powerful and relentless enemies. We are in the distressing position of all who find their axioms doubted: axioms which, like all axioms, are so self-evident that any show of dissidence outrages our morals and paralyzes our minds. And we have responded as men generally do respond to such provocation: for the most part we seem able to think of nothing better than repression; we seek to extirpate the heresies and wreak vengeance on the heretics. We have authentically reproduced the same kind of hysteria that swept over England in the time of Titus Oates and during the French Revolution, and over ourselves after the Civil War and the First War, except that in our own case we have outdone our precedents."

One notices that mention of the eighteenth century. For Judge Hand it is in a liberal culture and especially in the reading of history, rather than in abstract doctrine, that we can find incitement to patience and tolerance: "I conceive that there is nothing which gives a man more pause before taking as absolute what his feelings welcome, and his mind deems plausible, than even the flicker of a recollection that something of the sort has been tried before, felt before, disputed before, and for some reason or other has now gone quite into Limbo. . . . it is not so much history one leans on as the fact that one is aware that man has had a history at all. The liberation is not in the information but in the background acquired, the sense of mutability, and of the transience of what seems so poignant and so pressing today."

In all these papers there is a deep undercurrent of pessimism, and it is always matched by courage and hope. Again and again there are references to man's cousinship with the apes, and these references are not meant to be jokes. Again and again there is cold, detached formulation of what man is in practice, and how he behaves. No position could be further removed from that of Rousseau. Judge Hand, whose work has always been for freedom un-

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der law, for freedom realized through the guaranty of law, can write this terrifying sentence: "Liberty is so much latitude as the powerful choose to accord to the weak." And he can add, "If a community decides that some conduct is prejudicial to itself, and so decides by numbers sufficient to impose its will upon dissenters, I know of no principle which can stay its hand."

Having written thus, he finds it in his power to hope and believe. His mind is complicated, civilized; it is in a complicated, slowly elaborated civilization built upon man's unexplained, inexplicable desire for freedom that he believes, and in this he hopes. He sees civilization now advancing, now in regression, but constantly threatened by the irrational surges of man's other but equally real quality—that which proceeds from unmastered bestial instincts. And so, "Rather let us say with Cardinal Newman: 'One step enough for me.' " And also, "Nothing is perfect." And also, quoting Oliver Cromwell before the Battle of Dunbar, " 'I beseech ye in the bowels of Christ, think that ye may be mistaken.' I should like to have that written over the portals of every church, every school, and every court house . . ."

Escape from Labels

The memory of two great men is in this book—the great Mr. Justice Holmes, the philosopher William James. But even were they not there, the text of these occasional papers year after year would reveal that Judge Hand has been strongly nourished in such doctrines as pragmatism and others which describe morals as being in a constant state of change. These are controversial systems. To some degree they are narrow systems in that they exclude certain absolutes which are dear to many.

They do not bind nor do they limit Judge Hand's thinking. His peculiarly American attitude stands above categories. His book escapes from labels. For here, in serene but active combat against all tyrannies, is a man sure of one thing only: that mankind, close or not to the apes, sporadically subject to hysteria, bloodied and murderous in war after war, self-centered and blind to the longer view, yet can desire and work for and hope for the Good Life.

The explanations of Judge Hand's attitude do not matter. Perhaps there are none—or at least none that can be made into a system and taught. But there is a technique he would have us follow. It is a simple and difficult one. Learned Hand defined it when he was but twenty-one: It is to do some work "that will need no undoing."

IN CENTRAL PARK

In 1944 an "I Am an American Day" was celebrated in Central Park. To many, that sort of performance is like Mother's Day. One suspects commercialism in the latter; in the former, a vaguely disturbing self-conscious ostentation. In 1944, with the war still unsettled, great numbers of new citizens and old went to the Park to hear the speakers. Whatever they expected—whatever people expected at Gettysburg—they must have had the surprise of their life. They heard Judge Learned Hand deliver the following address:

We have gathered here to affirm a faith, a faith in a common purpose, a common conviction, a common devotion. Some of us have chosen America as the land of our adoption; the rest have come from those who did the same. For this reason we have some right to consider ourselves a picked group, a group of those who had the courage to break from the past and brave the dangers and the loneliness of a strange land. What was the object that nerved us, or those who went before us, to this choice? We sought liberty; freedom from oppression, freedom from want, freedom to be ourselves. This we then sought; this we now believe that we are by way of winning. What do we mean when we say that first of all we seek liberty? I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon constitutions, upon laws and upon courts. These are false hopes; believe me, these are false hopes. Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it. While it lies there it needs no constitution, no law, no court to save it. And what is this liberty which must lie in the hearts of men and women? It is not the ruthless, the unbridled will; it is not freedom to do as one likes. That is the denial of liberty, and leads straight to its overthrow. A society in which men recognize no check upon their freedom soon becomes a society where freedom is the possession of only a savage few; as we have learned to our sorrow.

What then is the spirit of liberty? I cannot define it; I can only tell you my own faith. The spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not too sure that it is right; the spirit of liberty is the spirit which seeks to understand the minds of other men and women; the spirit of liberty is the spirit which weighs their interests alongside its own without bias; the spirit of liberty remembers that not even a sparrow falls to earth unheeded; the spirit of liberty is the spirit of Him who, near two thousand years ago, taught mankind that lesson it has never learned, but has never quite forgotten; that there may be a kingdom where the least shall be heard and considered side by side with the greatest. And now in that spirit, that spirit of an America which has never been, and which may never be; nay, which never will be except as the conscience and courage of Americans create it; yet in the spirit of that America which lies hidden in some form in the aspirations of us all; in the spirit of that America for which our young men are at this moment fighting and dying; in that spirit of liberty and of America I ask you to rise and with me pledge our faith in the glorious destiny of our beloved country.

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

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OUR MARINES' LIFELINE to the sea was in danger. A Communist force of 4,000 men had seized the key hill overlooking Hagaru-ri in the desperate Chosin Reservoir fighting. The hill had to be taken. But there were no combat forces available to make the fight.

Lieutenant Colonel Myers, then a major, rallied together clerks, cooks, and other service personnel, and led a makeshift unit of 250 men in an assault up the snow-covered 600-foot hill. Lacking combat officers and non-coms, Colonel Myers ranged the entire attacking front, leading his outnumbered forces upward in the face of murderous fire concentrated on him. After 14 hours of bitter struggle, the enemy was routed, the hill captured, and the route to the sea secured. Colonel Myers says:

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